University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2018

State Capitalism on the Ascent: Stress, Shock, and
Adaptation of the International Law on Foreign
Investment
Julien Chaisse

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Chaisse, Julien, "State Capitalism on the Ascent: Stress, Shock, and Adaptation of the International Law on Foreign Investment"
(2018). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 342.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/342

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article
State Capitalism on the Ascent: Stress, Shock, and
Adaptation of the International Law on Foreign
Investment
By Julien Chaisse
Abstract
This Article focuses on the rise of state capitalism and its
consequences on the international law of foreign investment and
transnational arbitration which were both historically designed
to regulate foreign private investments. The increasingly free
movement of capital and the dominance of multinational
corporations in cross-border trade and investment have brought
with them increased suspicion about the motives of statecontrolled entities (SCEs) when they invest, allocate scarce
resources, procure goods and services, and move goods and
services across national borders. When state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) become involved in
transnational economic activities, either as the perceived
“transgressor” or as the “defender” in the face of rules or
administrative actions targeted towards such entities, the
debate becomes increasingly tense. The increased suspicion
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includes concerns by countries about threats to their national
security and to the competitive interests of producers and
consumers based in their respective territories, among other
concerns. This Article revisits the concept of state capitalism as
it has developed in three key jurisdictions (China, France and
the United States). It then presents the key legal international
instruments granting rights to SCEs and obligations upon host
States by looking at the litigation forum SCEs can access. By
looking at the litigation options available to SCEs, this Article
clarifies and evaluates the progressive adaptation of economic
rules to State capitalism and demonstrate the gradual inclusion
of SCEs in the world economy and its rules.
INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing trend towards market liberalization
and privatization observed over the last two decades,1 the role of
the state (not to say state interventionism2) has in this period of
time arguably grown in importance in the sphere of national and
transnational business activities.3 Notably, investments from
emerging economies have increased, a large proportion of which
was executed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs)4 and sovereign
1. See Larry Cata Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-owned Enterprises, and the
Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 180 (2010); Ian
Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market, 88
FOREIGN AFF. 40 (2009) (discussing how the recent economic crisis is
underlining the role to be played by the national governments in no certain
terms); see also Niall Ferguson, We’re All State Capitalists Now, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Feb. 9, 2012, 10:51 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/09/were-all-statecapitalists-now/.
2. See Joshua Kurlantzick, State Capitalism and the Return of Economic
Interventionism, WORLD POL. REV. (July 12, 2016), http://www.worldpolitics
review.com/articles/19334/state-capitalism-and-the-return-of-economicinterventionism.
3. See also Joseph L. Bower et al., Global Capitalism at Risk: What Are
You Doing About It?, HARV. BUS. REV. 105 (2011); see also Christopher A.
McNally, Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political
Economy, 64 WORLD POL. 765 (2012); see generally Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G.
Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varities of State Capitalism and their
Implications for Economic Performance, HARV. BUS. SCH. 1 (2012) (discussing
the extent and reach of state capitalism around the world, and its economic
implications); New Masters of the Universe: State Capitalism’s Global Reach,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21542925.
4. See The Visible Hand, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012),
https://www.economist.com/node/21542931; see also U.S.–CHINA ECON.
SECURITY REV. COMM’N, 112th CONG., ANN. REP. at 40 (2011). International
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wealth funds (SWFs).5 This trend has been further reinforced
since 2008/2009 by the fact that sovereign investors have
blatantly retained their influence, despite the fears and
turbulences that spread all over the world in the wake of the
global economic and financial crisis.6
The rise of sovereign investment via state-controlled
entities (SCEs) is more than the addition of a new asset class.7
tribunals have had to define SOEs, and the Salini v. Morocco decision on
jurisdiction notes that generally any commercial company dominated or
predominantly controlled by the State or by State institutions, whether it has a
legal personality or not, is considered to be a State-owned company. See Salini
Costruttori v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3,
(July 16, 2001). Furthermore, the Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Libya Final Arbitral
Award notes that, in certain circumstances, the separate personality of an
entity fully controlled by a State can be discarded and the State is considered
to be bound by the terms of a contract entered into by such an entity.
Accordingly, the tribunal decides that the arbitration clause set out in the
contract may be invoked against various State organs/entities. See Al-Kharafi
& Sons Co. v. Libya, Final Arbitral Award, 263, 266, 268, (Mar. 22, 2013). The
definition of SOEs is controversial. Official statistics from the Chinese Ministry
of Finance define SOEs as including only wholly state-owned companies. In this
article, SOEs are defined more broadly to include wholly state-owned SOEs and
companies whose majority shares are owned by the Chinese government at
various levels (including the central, provincial, and municipal levels), see Scott
Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies are Bigger than Ever – and Mostly
State-Owned, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/chinaglobal-500-government-owned/.
5. Both forms of investments originate from state ownership and state
activity, and are thus regularly referred to as investments by “state-controlled
entities” (SCEs). See R. Gilson & C.J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1346 (2008); see also Julien Chaisse et al., Emerging Sovereign
Wealth Funds in the Making: Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory
Strategies, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 837 (2011); Musacchio & Lazzarini, supra note
3.
6. See David Welch et al., Smithfield Stoking U.S. Unease Belies Benefit
of China Deals, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-06-06/smithfield-stoking-u-s-unease-belies-benefit-of-chinesedeals.html (“Private companies are also freer of government influence.”). See
generally Thilo Hanemann & Adam Lysenko, Chinese FDI in the United States:
Q1 2013 Update, RHODIUM GROUP (Apr. 30, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/chinesefdi-in-the-united-states-q1-2013-update (“In the past 15 months private
Chinese firms spent more on US deals than in the 11 years before combined. In
the same period, they accounted for 80% of transactions and 50% of total
transaction value, a dramatic change compared to previous years when stateowned firms dominated Chinese capital flows to the US.”).
7. See Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International Law
for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKLEY J.
INT’L L. 1, 142 (2010) (“In many countries, entities that are owned by the state
but possess a separate legal personality (“state-owned entities”‘) play a key role
in strategically important sectors.”).
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The SCEs’ growth prowess is a reflection of the new role of
developing economies, and this illustrates a shift in emphasis in
the global economy.8 Just as the norm in recent decades was for
Western companies and portfolio investors to invest in emerging
and developing countries—meaning capital flowed from North to
South—it is now observed that the present capital surpluses in
the South will seek out investment opportunities in the North.9
In some cases this is achieved through private sector
investment, but because many emerging and developing
countries do not (for various reasons) have privately owned
companies of sufficient size to invest significantly in
industrialized countries, this is increasingly done by SCEs,
which makes state capitalism a key feature of contemporary
global economy.
Such an evolution is generating a number of political and
economic problems that the law has to address. SCEs’
transnational economics raises concerns because it highlights
the importance of state activity in the global economy which is
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces.10 The legal
analysis has already explored the ramifications in the trade
world.11 The issue is far more serious when one looks at the
international capital trends and prospects. SCEs make
significant investments across borders which allow them to
control local assets. The reality of foreign investment, and the
8. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], State-Owned
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, TAD/TC/WP
(2012)10/FINAL (May 18, 2012). See generally Elizabeth J. Drake, Chinese
State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Testimony before the US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission 1 (2012) (discussing how the economies with
high SOE shares account for much smaller shares of world trade than China
and display a strong heterogeneity with regard to their role in world trade,
relative to their GDP).
9. See also Julien Chaisse, Issues for State-controlled Entities, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
MITSUO MATSUSHITA 235 (Julien Chaisse & Tsai-Yu Lin eds., 2016).
10. See Recruitment, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMIN.
COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL (June 28, 2004), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/
n1461859/c1463576/content.html; U.S.–CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV.
COMM’N, supra note 4; Cendrowski, supra note 4; see generally Wooldridge,
supra note 4 (discussing the rise of state capitalism, as an alternative to liberal
capitalism).
11. For an in-depth analysis, see Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and
World Trade Law, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 409 (2014) (analyzing how China’s
practice of state capitalism challenges the world trading system and how WTO
law, as interpreted by WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body (AB),
addresses these challenges).
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idea that foreigners may control national assets, has given rise
to a number of “protectionist reactions.” There are fears that
SCEs may not make investment decisions based on economic
reasons, but instead they may choose to invest for political
purposes.12 Further, most countries that have set up SCEs are
located in the developing world, which ultimately may result in
a politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SCEs.13 The legal
problems raised by SCEs’ investments will become more acute
because, as a result of the financial crisis and the ensuing
recession, the need for international investment in the United
States or the European Union (EU) will also continue to grow,
and this will inevitably increase the probability that SCEs will
face obstacles in foreign markets and hence will resort to
international dispute settlement to resolve this new kind of
dispute.
However, the legal situation is complex. Although Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) has increased significantly over the last
two decades—outpacing the already significant expansion of
trade during the same period—the current international legal
framework for SCE investments is highly fragmented.14 The
current framework consists of a wide variety of national and
international rules and principles that differ in form, strength,
and coverage.15 The result is an increasingly complex
12. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent
Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011)
(discussing policy changes that favor politically influential interest groups).
13. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). For discussions of the
empire-building incentives of China’s SOE managers, see Angela H. Zhang,
Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 395 (2014).
14. See generally Julien Chaisse & Chistian Bellak, Navigating the
Expanding Universe of Investment Treaties—Creation and Use of Critical Index,
18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2015) (explaining the lack of a general theory to analyze
the expanding patchwork of international foreign investment).
15. These separate investment chapters in PTAs are comparable, on
average, to self-standing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). They can include
both rules on investment liberalization (non-discrimination safeguards) and
investment protection (substantive standards of treatment afforded by the host
state to the foreign investor or investment). See United Nations Conference on
Trade and Dev.(UNCTAD), Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, UNCTAD
22 (2014). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a prime
example of an agreement with a wide scope covering investment since it
includes three members. See North American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nafta.asp (last visited
Feb. 14, 2018). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is another example of
ambitious trade pat including investment matters with twelve members. See
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international setting for international investment in which
foreign investors can reap the benefits of rights that ensure their
investments great protection. Along with an increase in number
of International Investment Agreements (IIAs), the last decade
has also witnessed an exponential surge in investment disputes
between foreign investors and host country governments,16 and
one can anticipate seeing a growing number of cases brought by
SCEs before international investment arbitral tribunals. It is
precisely this legal scenario that this Article wants to explore.
The international regime for foreign investment, which
includes both substantive rules and arbitration principles, is
gradually adjusting to the emergence of SCEs in the investment
sphere. This adjustment implicitly means that the rules and
practice of international investment are reshaped by actors that
were not initially at the center of the regime. Actually it is a
great paradox; the regime for foreign investment, as designed in
the last three decades, was intended to serve the interest of
private investors seen as the main driver of the global economy.
Instead of excluding SCEs from its realm and favoring the
emergence of different rules, the international investment
regime is gradually absorbing state capitalism. This Article
provides a detailed analysis of the forces driving this
transformation, of the flexibility of the international norms that
apply to SCEs, and, finally, of the rights that SCEs are
acquiring.
To demonstrate that state capitalism is reshaping
international economic law, this Article first discusses the rise
of capitalism at the global level from both economic and legal
perspectives (although a strong focus is on China, the analysis
also covers the cases of both the United States and France). In
the second section, the relevant norms of international economic
Elizabeth Sheargold, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES
341 (2016) (providing an overview of the recently concluded TPP Agreement).
16. On the emerging issue of sovereign debt restructuring by international
tribunals, see Julien Chaisse et al., Greek Debt Restructuring, Abaclat v.
Argentina and Investment Treaty Commitments: The Impact of International
Investment Agreements on the Greek Default, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW AFTER THE GLOBAL CRISIS: A TALE OF FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINES 306 (C.L.
Lim & Bryan Mercurio, eds. 2015). Arbitral panels are charged with the task of
applying the rules of IIAs in specific cases, an often-complex process given the
broad and sometimes ambiguous terms of these arrangements. See generally
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173 (2005) (noting that foreign investors are
increasingly resorting to the mechanism of international arbitration for
resolving their disputes with the government of a host country).
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law are reviewed with a view to understand which would best fit
the need of SCEs in their transnational activities. The third
section addresses the critical issue of the legal standing of SCEs
under investment treaties, since it determines the ability of
SCEs to effectively benefit from international rights. Finally, the
fourth section analyzes the substantive rights which can benefit
SCEs and which will drive the investment strategies of many
SCEs in the coming years.
I. THE RISE OF STATE CAPITALISM
The term “state capitalism” means an economic system in
which the state controls a substantial part of or even all of
capital, industry and business.17 It is therefore a command
system where all or part of the means of production are legally
the property of the state, or subject to its guidelines. Sometimes
the means of production are in fact held, private or controlled,
by the privileged class of the population that monopolizes
political power. This expression appeared in the late nineteenth
century, in the midst of the anti-capitalist movement, and was
presented as a negative perspective.18 Its use has expanded
during the twentieth century.19 There are differences, especially
in terms of political affinity, as the plans are or have been state
capitalist. Among the schemes often analyzed as such are:
Germany in the First World War, the Soviet Union, and now
China, Cuba and Algeria, from Houari Boumedienne.20 This
section discusses the notion of “state capitalism” before it looks
at key examples of contemporary “state capitalism” entities in
the United States, France, and China.

17. There is a growing literature on state capitalism and its implications
for legal changes in China. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are
the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism
in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 699 (2013); Du, supra note 11. For a discourse
on state capitalism in general, see, e.g., Bremmer, supra note 1, at 40.
18. See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of
Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2013).
19. Id. at 571.
20. See generally Julien Chaisse, supra note 9, at 238–39 (discussing state
capitalism and potential market distortions among world schemes).

346

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2
A. THE NOTION OF STATE CAPITALISM

There is no single definition of “state capitalism.”21 State
capitalism is similar to state socialism (i.e. mostly adopted in
those socialist states, such as China and Cuba).
[It is] usually described as an economic system in which
commercial economic activity is undertaken by the state
in the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulting
in the state owning and controlling most of the means of
production and capital. Also, the management and
organization of that SOEs’ means of production is in a
capitalist manner. Ming Du stated that state capitalism
is the Chinese economic system, which is fundamentally
different from western liberal market capitalism. Also,
the substantial reason that state capitalism has been
developed in China is because the Chinese government
has transformed from a command economy to a market
economy (i.e. socialism with Chinese characteristics).
The way that the Chinese government exercised the
‘state capitalism’ is that they directly or indirectly
controlled a large number of powerful SOEs, especially
in strategic and key sectors (e.g. China Sinopec).22
Kratsas and Truby stated that the ‘interests of sovereign
and private investors clash’ through state directed
capitalism market and accept Keynes’s maxim that
‘international cash flows are always political,’ and
Kratsas and Truby have stated that is problematic.23
In essence, the term “state capitalism” can refer to economic
systems in which capitalism is entirely state driven, or, by
extension of another system, where private capitalism has
strong state dependence.24 In the latter case, the term can be
21. See generally Catherine P. Mulder, State Capitalism vis-à-vis Private
Communism, 27 RETHINKING MARXISM 258 (2015) (discussing state-owned
enterprises, and the oversimplified approach of labeling them exclusively as
either part of the public or private sector); see also Musacchio & Lazzarini,
supra note 4.
22. Id. at 409.
23. See Julien Chaisse, Demystifying Public Security Exception and
Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign
Investments in the EU Internal Market, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 583, 589 (2016)
(citing to Du, supra note 11, at 409, 411; Mulder, supra note 21, at 259).
24. See also Chao Xi, The Political Economy of Takeover Regulation: What
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confused with concepts and precise theories such as
mercantilism, protectionism, or interventionism. The latter
usage, more common in English and French, is then used to
support the opposition to “laissez-faire” and refers to economic
policies such as the New Deal.25
Historically, Mikhail Bakunin has developed the theoretical
beginnings of Statism and Anarchy in concept, and in his
writings, he criticizes Karl Marx’s theories, describing them as
“authoritarian communism.”26 Bakunin proclaimed that the
application of Marxist theories simply leads to the application of
capital to production by the only banker, the state, which means
that the state would behave in the same way that a capitalist
manager (such a banker or a boss) would.27 Fifty years later,
some anarchists see a confirmation of the predictions of Bakunin
in the economic reality of the Soviet Union—even if the economic
policy in the USSR did not correspond to the economic thinking
of Karl Marx.28
In light of these theories, a public company, or a state
enterprise, can be defined as a company over which the state or
other authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant
influence by virtue of ownership, financial participation or the
rules which govern, as defined in the EU.29 Such dominant
influence is presumed when the public authorities, directly or
indirectly, in respect to the company, hold the majority of the
subscribed capital of the company or control the majority of the
votes attached to shares issued by the company or may appoint
more than half the members of the administrative,
management, or business surveillance.30

Does the Mandatory Bid Rule in China Tell Us, 2 J. BUS. L. 142 (2015).
25. For an excellent overview, see Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a
New Deal, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175 (2011).
26. See generally Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, in CAMBRIDGE
TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 106 (Raymond Geuss ed., 1990)
(discussing statism and anarchy in the context of the struggle between parties
in the International Working Men’s Association).
27. Id. at 172.
28. See Noah Chomsky, Notes on Anarchism, in FOR REASONS OF STATE
(1973), https://chomsky.info/state01/.
29. See Fabbrini, supra note 25, at 1175.
30. See Du, supra note 11, at 435.
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B. THE CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF STATE CAPITALISM

Talking about SOEs immediately brings China into the
spotlight, but there are many other jurisdictions where SOEs are
important economic actors. A number of state enterprises do
exist within the EU—and France is a fascinating case in point.31
Outside the EU, public enterprises may also correspond to this
definition, including some in the United States, where they exist
in two legal forms. The first are federal public companies (of
which there are very few and are usually temporarily acquired
by the federal government and placed under judicial supervision,
according to Chapter 11 of the United States bankruptcy law in
sectors considered strategic and in order to avoid their
liquidation under Chapter 7). The second are public companies
of the state (many of which are owned or controlled by one of the
federal states, or even several states associated in the operation
if companies are larger in size).32
1. China’s State Capitalism
In the latest Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS) report to Congress there were ninetyseven covered transactions, and twenty-one of those by Chinese
investors in 2013.33 Behind this suspicion lies the perception
that China’s businesses are too close to the Communist Party.34
It also shows how important Chinese investments have become
to the United States, while a number of Chinese companies
remain controlled by the state.35
31. See also Benjamin Mojuyé, French Corporate Governance in the New
Millennium: Who Watches the Board in Corporate France, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
73 (2000); see also Justin Yifu Lin et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, and StateOwned Enterprise Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1998).
32. See generally Frieder Roessler, State Trading and Trade Liberalization,
in STATE TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 264 (M.M. Kostechi ed., 1982)
(examining different approaches to the liberalization of trade).
33. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., 114TH CONG., ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (Comm. Print 2015); see also WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 1 (2012).
34. See Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Are Chinese Companies Taking
over the World, 7 CHINA J. INT’L L. 105 (2006); Jason Dean et al., China’s ‘State
Capitalism’ Sparks a Global Backlash, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703514904575602731006315198.
35. See generally EXIT THE DRAGON?: PRIVATIZATION AND STATE CONTROL
IN CHINA 16 (Stephen Green & Guy S. Liu eds., Chatham House 2006)
(evaluating China’s privatization experience); see also U.S.-CHINA ECON.
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In this new economic system, public enterprises, or
“Danwei,” are struggling to find their place and they are
encountering more and more difficulties.36 They reached record
losses of 102.6 billion yuan (12.5 billion United States dollars
(USD)) in 2005, an increase of 56.7% year by year, according to
figures from the State Bureau of Statistics (NBS).37 In the first
two months of 2006, losses of public enterprises or statecontrolled enterprises already reached 26.2 billion yuan (3.25
billion USD).38 The increase in production costs, an inefficient
pricing system, overcapacity, and significant technological gaps
are the main causes of this situation, according to Jiang Yuan, a
statistician at the State Bureau of Statistics.39
The presence of foreign firms in China is largely responsible
for the sharp acceleration in export growth.40 The establishment
of “market socialism” has resulted in the construction of many
factories in China, which may now be termed the workshops of
the world, because of the social dumping of its plants.41 They
attract a skilled workforce in coastal areas as that is where such
workshops are located. Only 10.3% of China’s exports come from
wholly Chinese companies.42 Today, 43.2% of exports from China
are made by companies whose capital is 100% foreign and 46.5%
are the result of partnerships between foreign companies and
Chinese companies.43 Mainland China maintains its
SECURITY REV. COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND
STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA 76 (Comm. Print 2011); Yuanzheng Cao et. al.,
From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style, 7 ECON. IN
TRANSITION 103 (1999); Shaomin Li et. al., The Road to Capitalism:
Competition and Institutional Change in China, 28 J. COMP. ECON. 269 (2000);
Minxie Pei, The Dark Side of China’s Rise, FOREIGN POL. (Oct. 20 2009),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/the-dark-side-of-chinas-rise/.
36. See Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The
Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 231–32 (2008).
37. SOEs’ losses hit record US$12.75b in 2005, China Daily (Mar. 28, 2006,
8:55 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/28/content_553865.
htm.
38. Id.
39. Id. See also See Chinese State-Owned and State Controlled Enterprises:
Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: Hearing Before
the U.S-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm’n, 112th Cong. 127 (2012)
(statement of Elizabeth J. Drake, Partner, Stewart and Stewart); OECD,
International Trade and Investment by State Enterprises, (Sept. 2012).
40. See, e.g., Silk & Malish, supra note 34, at107.
41. See McNally, supra note 3, at756–58.
42. Nature of China’s Export Enterprises, Foreign Investment Monthly,
Ministry of Commerce China, Table 5, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/table2016//
tab05.pdf
43. Id.
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attractiveness for companies with its labor force, which is cheap,
non-unionized, and docile. An unskilled worker in China costs
about one USD per hour, which is well below the minimum wage
of the industrialized countries.44 The non-organization of
Chinese workers represents a substantial benefit for employers,
who find such “job flexibility” impossible to implement in liberal
democracies. Together, the two Chinese giants of mobile
telephone companies, namely, China Mobile and China Unicom,
have about a billion customers.45
A series of reforms accompanied the dual internal
liberalization and opening movement on the world market.46
One law authorized individuals to have limited liability
companies.47 In 2004, the Constitution was revised to strengthen

44. Education Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
Resource Pack for Economics Curriculum (Secondary 4-6): Economic Analysis
and Evolution of Government Policies: Minimum Wage 2015, 2-3. (“Since the
last update in 2009, the federal minimum wage has stood at US$7.25 per hour
[in the United States].” “In China, the Provisions on Minimum Wages were
effective from March 1, 2004. The setting of minimum wage is delegated to local
governments, which choose a monthly minimum for full-time workers, and an
hourly minimum for part-time workers.” “There is a wide range of minimum
wage levels across the country. In general, the highest wages are in the more
developed coastal regions and the lowest ones in the less developed central and
western provinces. . . . The lowest ones were around RMB10 (US$1.64).”)
45. See Number of Mobile Subscribers in China as of January 2016, by
Operator (In Millions), STATISTIA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/291795/
china-mobile-subscribers/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2018).
46. See generally John Hassard et al., China’s State-Owned Enterprises:
Economic Reform and Organizational Restructuring, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE MGMT. 500 (2010) (discussing reforms of state-owned enterprises since
the beginning of China’s “open door” policy); Jonathan R. Woetzel, Reassessing
China’s State-Owned Enterprises, MCKINSEY Q. 1 (2008) (considering the value
state-owned companies might bring to a global partnership); see also Xu
Chenggang, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and
Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note
17.
47. During the SOE reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s, the government
allowed SOEs to retain an individually negotiated percentage of their profits,
which could be used to finance benefits and awards paid to managers and
employees. A 1994 tax reform set a uniform rate of tax on SOE profits; any
remaining profits belonged to the SOEs. See Louis Kuijs et al., SOE Dividends:
How Much and To Whom? 2 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 56651, 2005),
http://www-wds.worldbank.org.easyaccess1.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/09/17/00033495520100917050418/
Rendered/PDF/566510WP0SOE1E10Box353729B01PUBLIC1.pdf. However,
between 1994 and 2007, the state collected no dividends from SOEs. See
Nicholas Borst, SOE Dividends and Economic Rebalancing, PETERSON INST.
INT’L ECON. (May 11, 2012, 12:30 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/china-economicwatch/soe-dividends-and-economic-rebalancing.
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the role of the non-state sector and to reaffirm the right of
private property.48 The prohibition on private companies to
intervene in certain sectors (infrastructure, public services,
financial services) was abolished in 2004.49 FDI was allowed and
encouraged by the development of coastal zones and the
lowering of tariffs. The state monopoly on foreign trade was
dismantled and the multiple exchange rate system was
introduced.50 The private sector was expanded: “[b]etween 2010
and 2012, private sector firms produced between two-thirds and
three-quarters of China’s GDP; it also accounts for 90% of
China’s exports.”51 But, exports of the private sector under
Chinese control are still growing faster, as it receives new export
licenses.52 The state sector is parallel subject to ongoing
48. See Alberto Gabriele, The Role of the State in China’s Industrial
Development: A Reassessment, 52 COMP. ECON. STUD. 348 (2010).
49. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property
Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317,
335 (2008).
50. See Xu Chenggang, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms
and Development, 49 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011).
51. See Hassard et al., supra note 46. Jonathan Eckart, 8 Things You Need
to Know about China’s Economy, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (June 23, 2016)
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy/.
52. According to the ChinaDaily:
China’s private sector is gradually regaining momentum after a
gloomy 2016, as businesses become more optimistic on the country’s
economic outlook. In the first half of the year, fixed-asset investments
by the private sector grew 7.2 percent year on year, accounting for 60.7
percent of total investment, according to data from the National
Bureau of Statistics. The growth was much higher than the 3.2 percent
registered last year . . . .China’s economy expanded 6.9 percent for the
first half of 2017 . . . .China’s foreign trade increased at its fastest pace
since the second half of 2011, with exports in yuan-denominated terms
up 15 percent year on year in the first half of this year (2017).
Xinhua, China’s Private Sector Regains Strength on Optimistic Economic
Outlook, ChinaDaily.com (August, 2, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
business/2017-08/02/content_30328022.htm.
China has recently changed their regulatory rules to reflect this growth:
All institutions issuing export licenses for goods, and relevant
enterprises and entities: In accordance with the Foreign Trade Law of
the People’s Republic of China, the Regulation of the People’s Republic
of China on the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods and
the Measures for the Administration of Export Licenses for Goods, the
matters concerning the application for, issuance and use, and other
matters of export licenses for goods are clarified as follows:
1. The enterprises and entities applying for alumina, magnesia,
talcum lump (powder), fluorite, rare earth, tin and tin products,
tungsten and tungsten products, molybdenum, antimony and
antimony products, coke, silicon carbide, and indium and indium
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restructuring, which has led to the removal of millions of jobs
between 1998 and 2010.53 “Some 42 per cent of all SOEs lost
money in 2013, according to official data. Total profits for such
groups fell in absolute terms last year for the first time since
2001. The gap in return on assets between SOEs and private
firms is now the largest in two decades.”54 The tax system is
highly decentralized in China, and the provinces and small
governments that manage a large share of the tax revenue are

products (see the Annual Catalogue of Goods Subject to Export
Licensing Administration for H.S. codes) shall apply for export
licenses for goods based on the export contracts for goods.
2. The relevant license-issuing institutions shall, in accordance with
laws and regulations, effectively conduct the issuance of export
licenses for goods, further standardize their processes, optimize their
services, and ensure that export licenses for goods are issued and other
relevant matters are handled within the prescribed time limit.
3. The relevant enterprises and entities shall use export licenses for
goods in accordance with the law, and shall not trade, transfer, alter
or forge such licenses.
商务部配额许可证事务局关于货物出口许可证申领、签发等事宜的函 [Letter on
Matters Concerning the Application for, Issuance of, and Other Matters
Concerning, the Export Licenses for Goods] (promulgated by the Admin. Bureau
of Ministry of Com., effective date Jan. 25, 2017) LawInfoChina.
The Ministry of Commerce added new items to the application for an export
license as well:
The export of goods subject to export License Administration by
foreign-invested enterprises shall be handled in accordance with the
following requirements: (1) For the export of goods subject to export
quota administration by a foreign-invested enterprise, the issuing
agency shall issue export license in accordance with the export quota
quantity of such foreign-invested enterprise issued by the Ministry of
Commerce; for the export of goods subject to quota tendering
administration, relevant approval documents specified in Article 11(2)
shall be attached.
货物出口许可证管理办法 [Order No.11, Measures for the Administration of
License for the Export of Goods] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com., effective
Jul. 1, 2008), at art. 13.
53. Dong Zhang & Owen Freestone, China’s Unfinished State-owned
Enterprise Reforms, ECON. ROUNDUP, AUSTRL. GOV’T, TREASURY (2103)
https://treasury.gov.au/publication/economic-roundup-issue-2-2013-2/
economic-roundup-issue-2-2013/chinas-unfinished-state-owned-enterprisereforms/#P8_131 (“ . . . SOEs accounted for 20 per cent of total industrial
employment in 2010, falling from around 60 per cent in 1998. After shedding
tens of millions of workers while undergoing various reforms, SOEs are no
longer China’s major employer. The share of workers employed by SOEs have
more than halved between 1998 and 2010. The non-state sector is, and will
continue to be, the main source of employment.”).
54. Gabriel Wildau, China’s State-owned Zombie Economy, FIN. TIMES
(Feb.
29,
2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/253d7eb0-ca6c-11e5-84df70594b99fc47.
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also involved in education and health.55 There is very little
financial solidarity between the provinces.56
In his last speech on the State of the Union, President
Barack Obama said that “anyone who tells you otherwise,
anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our
influence has waned, doesn’t know what they are talking
about.”57 In Beijing, this facile patriotism must make people
smile. China’s revival threatens American power, especially in
the Asia-Pacific region. This situation has been clear for some
time, at least for observers who know what they are talking
about.58
The rivalry between the two superpowers is also a rivalry
between two economic models: market capitalism against state
capitalism. In fact, market capitalism has just gone through five
particularly difficult years. Remember the Washington
Consensus, the list of ten possible measures to Americanize the
emerging markets in the 1990s?59 The United States
government and international financial institutions have tried
to persuade various countries to impose fiscal discipline, to
reduce or to eliminate their budget deficits, to expand their tax
base, to lower their tax rates, to allow the market to set its
interest rates and exchange rates, and to liberalize trade and
capital flows. When the Asian economies were hit by the
financial crisis in 1997–1998, critics were quick to lament the
“crony capitalism” of this region,60 and, at the time, they could
55. China’s former Premier repeatedly called for political reforms—an
indication that the Chinese leadership recognizes that further economic reforms
require new political institutions. See Malcolm Moore, Wen Jiabao Promises
Political Reform for China, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8040534/Wen-Jiabao-promises-politicalreform-for-China.html; Michael Wines, Wen Calls for Political Reform but
Sidesteps Details, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/15/world/asia/china-wen-jiabao-calls-for-political-reform.html.
56. See Gary Hufbauer, China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage:
An Overview, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE
PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT 47, 50 (Fredrick M. Abbott ed., 1998); see also
John H. Jackson, The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 19, 26 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003).
57. Ferguson, supra note 1.
58. See, e.g., Mattlin Mikael, Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises
and Ownership Control, 21 BICCS ASIA PAPER 3, 8 (2010); Bremmer, supra note
1.
59. John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27
J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195 (2004).
60. Alan Beattie, Suharto and the Crisis of Asian Crony Capitalism,
January 1998, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/f503fa82-
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claim to have economic history on their side.
But, since then, America has experienced a financial crisis,
the biggest since the Great Depression. And the world has
changed. Not only did the collapse of the financial markets
(2008–2009) seem to have highlighted the fragility of the
capitalist system, but the apparent ease with which China has
escaped the aftermath of the collapse of Wall Street opens up the
possibility of a new “Beijing Consensus,” based on both central
planning and a state which can control the fluctuations of
market forces. In his book, The End of the Free Market, Ian
Bremmer (the president of Eurasia Group) argues that
authoritarian governments around the world have “invented
something new: state capitalism.”61 For Bremmer, state
capitalism is a major “threat” not only for the model of free trade,
but also for democracy in the developing world.62
2. U.S. State Capitalism
Companies backed by the government (governmentsponsored enterprises, or GSEs)63 are a group of financial service
companies created by the United States Congress. Their
function is to improve the flow of credit to targeted sectors of the
economy and to make these segments a more efficient and
transparent capital market.64 The desired effect of GSEs is to
improve the availability and to reduce the cost of credit for
borrowers’ targeted sectors: agriculture, real estate finance, and
education.65 Congress created the first GSE in 1916 with the
creation of the Farm Credit System for financing the
agricultural sector;66 it initiated GSEs in the real estate
5159-11dd-b751-000077b07658.
61. See Bremmer, supra note 1.
62. Id. at 55.
63. Credit-Rating Agencies and Financial Markets: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Mark Adelson, Member,
Adelson-Jacob Consulting).
64. In the United States, “[d]istinctions between the governmental and
private sectors are especially blurred with respect to a category of organization
known as ‘government-sponsored enterprises’ (GSE).” KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG.
RES. SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH
BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 7 (2011).
Typically, GSEs are privately owned but enjoy implicit government guarantees
of obligations. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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financing segment with the creation of the Federal Home Loan
Banks in 1932;67 and targeted education by regulating Sallie
Mae in 1972.68 The housing loans segment is by far the largest
borrower’s segment in which GSEs operate.
Together, the three housing finance GSEs (Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks) hold
billions of dollars in outstanding loans, as shown in their income
statements.69 The federal government owns warrants which, if
exercised, would allow it to take a share of 79.9% ownership in
these companies.70 The federal government has so far not
exercised these warrants. These companies include: Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, Sallie Mae, and Federal Home
Loan Banks.71
Regulated companies held by the federal government
(federal government-chartered and -owned corporations) are a
separate set of companies that have been initiated, controlled
and owned by the federal government to operate in the provision
of federal public services, but, unlike federal agencies (such as
the Environmental Protection Agency or the Bureau of Indian
Affairs) or federal independent commissions (e.g., the Federal
Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, etc.), they have a separate legal personality from
the federal government, thereby providing the highest degree of
independence from political power.72 They sometimes receive

67. See Julie A. Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the
Farm Credit System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010).
68. Congress has also authorized Sallie Mae to resign government
partnership to become a fully private institution in 2008. See James Politi,
Sallie Mae Gains $ 31bn Financing, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), https://www.ft.
com/content/5b95dc94-cda6-11dc-9e4e-000077b07658.
69. For an analysis of the methodological challenges of valuing the
subsidies, see Ron Feldman, Estimating and Managing the Federal Subsidy of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Is Either Task Possible?, 11 J. PUB. BUDGETING,
ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 81, 83 (1999); Edward J. Kane, Housing Finance GSEs:
Who Gets the Subsidy, 15 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 197, 197 (1999).
70. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T OFF. PUB. AFF., FACT SHEET: TREASURY SENIOR
PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf.
71. See USHA C.V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE
INDUSTRY: STATE CAPITALISM, BUSINESS STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY 24
(2013) (explaining that the two best-known GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, were placed into government conservatorship at the height of the 2008–09
financial crisis). But cf. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 17 (providing an analysis of
the Chinese SOEs as a “networked hierarchy” with deep connections to the
party-state).
72. These companies include: National Railroad Passenger Corporation
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federal budget appropriations, but some have independent
sources of income.
The companies acquired by the federal government are a
separate set of companies that were neither initially created nor
controlled by the federal government, but of which the
government has taken ownership in order to operate them itself.
They are in two categories:
 the Incidental Governmental Corporations (IGCs): these
companies are temporarily in the possession of the
government by the capture effect of the property of a
defaulter of the government, such as the offending
companies with the tax authorities or an inability to repay
funds that were advanced to them for the supply of
products and services not rendered to the government;
usually, they are waiting for a legal tender and are too
small to be rated individually, especially because their
survival time is short; and
 the companies acquired by the government (governmentacquired corporations, or GACs): these are companies
whose shares and/or assets were purchased by the
Federal Government, because of the fact that these
companies were found to be strategic and “too big to fail”
(Amtrak), Tennessee Valley Authority, Corporation for Public Broadcasting,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,
Millennium Challenge Corporation, St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Corporation for National
and Community Service (AmeriCorps), Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, Federal Reserve Legal Services Corporation, United States Postal
Service Conrail (former), Resolution Trust Corporation, and Panama Canal
Commission. See EDWIN M. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL
1860 (1954); JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS (1950); JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 1 (1956) [hereinafter HURST,
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM]; JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1960). See also JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 18361915 (1974) [hereinafter HURST, LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN]; JAMES W.
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1977); for a
comprehensive bibliography of works by and about Hurst, see Ronald Eskin &
Robert Hayden, James Willard Hurst (b. 1910) Bibliography, 10 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 325 (1975). Corporations were legislative creatures and thus, within the
limits discussed here, they were subject to regulation by their chartering states.
To a lesser degree, they were also subject to regulation by the states in which
they sought to do business. During the early nineteenth century, the states were
the only significant source of charters. Until the 1860s, the federal government
chartered only two corporations. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the
American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 57 (1975).
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or, in other words, that their liquidation would present too
high a systemic risk to the overall economy of the United
States to allow such companies to be liquidated, declared
bankrupt, or simply to cease to provide their services.
These companies include Citigroup, General Motors, and
AIG (American International Group).73
There is a second level of sovereign government in the
United States after the federal government, namely, the
different states of the Federation that make up the country.
State governments are legally sovereign entities and they owe
their sovereign existence to the sovereign people of their land
who created and wrote their State Constitution; they are not
corporate bodies, since they were not created by the achievement
of the federal government and they exist with or without the
consent of the federal government. As sovereign, they have the
power to detain the “radical title” to the land, and to exercise the
four fundamental powers (raising taxes, “eminent domain”,
police power, and exemption) as well as various other powers
(including the power to grant charters). The vast majority of nongovernment corporations in the United States are regulated by
the states and not by the federal government; this includes most
charities (although some of national reputation are regulated by
the federal government and not by a state government), nonprofit corporations, and corporations for profit.74 States, as
sovereign, also have the power to organize and regulate the
companies they own, for which they exercise control and have
responsibility for financing and directing. This includes:
 municipal corporations (MCs): these are public companies
that have a vested democratic control over local affairs in
a given geographic area (they exist in villages, cities,
suburbs, towns or counties).75 Although these municipal
73. See generally Kevin Kosar, Federal Government Corporations: An
Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (June 8, 2011) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL30365.pdf (defining federal government corporations and explaining their
characteristics). See also Martin Arnold, Citigroup Tops List of Global Banks
Posing Systemic Risk, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
3e7f5e1a-afe1-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0.
74. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States, Facts Sheet (Jan. 20,
2017) https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/266904.htm.
75. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1109 (1980). See Gerald E. Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in LEGAL
GEOGRAPHIES READER 154 (Blomley et al. eds., 2001), for an updated and
condensed version. See JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 16 (5th ed., 1911), for a contemporaneous analysis.
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corporations are often regulated and sometimes funded by
the state government, and can often collect local taxes,
they are public entities vested with limited scope and nonsovereign, and the state government that regulates them
is not legally responsible for their debts in the event of a
municipal bankruptcy; and
 regulated companies and state-owned (state-owned and chartered corporations, or SCOCs): these are numerous
and provide various public services. Examples include
North Dakota Mill and Elevator or South Dakota Public
Broadcasting.76 Generally speaking, a status document
passed by a state legislature authorizes a company owned
by the government to support a public service mission
with funds or public property.77 Lottery companies are
also owned by the state governments, such as the Georgia
Lottery Corporation and many others.78
There is a third level of sovereign government in the United
States, namely, the tribal governments of Native Americans.
The Native American tribes are included as former sovereignty
established by the sovereign people since time immemorial and
recognized as sovereign by the federal government of the United
States (as well as that of various states).79 As such, Native
American tribal governments (and Native Alaskans) have
specific rights to sovereignty, which include the power to detain
the “radical title” to the land, to exercise the four fundamental
powers (taxes, “eminent domain,” police power, and waiver) as
well as other powers, such as that of regulating companies and
supporting public tasks that can benefit their tribal citizens,
Native Americans and Native Alaskans who are also citizens of

76. The North Dakota Mill and Elevator Association began operating
October 22, 1922, as a value-added market for wheat produced in North Dakota,
which now adds value to 23 million bushels of North Dakota spring and durum
wheat annually by selling wheat products to various bakeries, pasta customers,
and food service suppliers—providing the state with an annual payroll of $7
million. About Us, N.D. MILL, https://www.ndmill.com/index.cfm/about/aboutus/ (last visited February 10, 2018).
77. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) in the United States: Facts Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(Jan. 20, 2017) https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/266904.htm.
78. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-27-4 (West 1992) (“[T]he Georgia Lottery
Corporation which shall be deemed to be an instrumentality of the state, and
not a state agency, and a public corporation.”).
79. See Tribal Governance, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (NCAI)
http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal-governance.

2018]

STATE CAPITALISM ON THE ASCENT

359

their respective states and also United States citizens.80 Native
Alaskans are particularly advanced in the exercise of their tribal
sovereignty in incorporating companies held by and for the
benefit of their tribal citizens and to compete in the highly
competitive economic sectors via the Alaska Native Regional
Corporations.81 The Native American tribes in the interior fortyeight states use their sovereignty and their ability to regulate
and organize it by using regulatory facilitation. Many tribes
have taken advantage of the Federal Native 8(a) Contracting
Program which allows companies owned by the federally
recognized tribes (SOEs) to participate in Federal contracting
and receive economic benefits from the United States federal
government.82 Some of these small businesses have proven to be
successful for tribal sovereign Native American and tribal
societies after being included in federal initiatives, finally
creating a successful federal economic program that works for
Native Americans.83
3. France’s State Capitalism
Industrial and commercial activities undertaken by the
administration are entrusted to public companies.84 It is, for
France, a body with legal personality in the public sector with a
possibility of private sector participation. There is no unique
status of the public company. Thus, there are a number of
different types of operations:
 an établissement public à caractère industriel et
commercial (Public Establishment in the Field of

80. See Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complicity’s Shadow: American Indian
Property, Soveriegnty, and the Future, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 487, 489 (2017);
Stephan Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 95, 98, 99, 174, 314 (4th ed.
2012).
81. See Alaska Native Corporations, RESOURCE DEV. COUNCIL,
http://www.akrdc.org/alaska-native-corporations (last visited Apr. 22, 2018).
82. See Native Am. Contractors Ass’n, What is the Native 8(a) Contracting
Program? https://www.chenega.com/Media/Default/Native%208(a)/NACA%
20brochure%20re%208(a)%20program.pdf.
83. See In Support of Native American Full Participation in the Small
Business Administration’s 8(A) Business Development Program, NCAI, Res.
SPO-16-059 (June 30, 2016) http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/insupport-of-native-american-full-participation-in-the-small-businessadministration-s-8-a-business-development-program. See also Native Am.
Contractors Ass’n, supra note 82.
84. See Mojuyé, supra note 31.
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Commercial and Industrial Sectors)85 (or EPIC) is a
category of public undertaking in France. It is subject to
public law, it is not open to the securities market and it
lacks capital86 EPICs are public agencies in the meaning
of public law when acting in the commercial and
industrial sectors.87 They can be represented either by
mixed companies jointly held by public and private
entities but are not subject to general law or by national
companies, whose equity capital is fully held by the state;
 domestic companies under private law but whose capital
is wholly owned by the state; and
 companies of mixed economy of private companies in
which the state or local governments invest, but do not
have half the capital (Article L. 1522-1 CGCL.).88
Sometimes the state transforms an EPIC into a national
company then sells shares (privatization). Thus, EPICs become
public companies, which in turn, private companies invests in.
Most public companies have been public since the 1945
nationalization.89 The state sold a portion of these investments
in 1986, and this initiated a large wave of privatizations under
the government of Jacques Chirac, and slow and incremental
sales in the years 1990 and 2003 (and others) by waves of
privatization, which allowed some companies to recapitalize (to
increase EDF’s capital, for example), to open certain sectors to
85. Sébastien Martin, The Difficulties Faced By Public Establishments In
Light Of Competition Law: A Discussion Of The “La Poste” Case, MONTESQUIEU
L. REV. Jan. 2015, at 108, 109 http://www.montesquieulawreview.eu/lr1_
content/mlr1.pdf (“On this basis, as for all other public-law entities in France
but unlike private companies, both La Poste and France Telecom do not have
any share capital and are not subject to the ordinary law on receivership and
judicial winding-up of firms in difficulty. As is emphasised [sic] in French legal
doctrine, “the particularities of the legal regime for some state-owned companies
remain linked to the fact that, behind a uniform title drawn from business law,
there indeed remains the specific strength of the public-law nature of those
companies that take the form of public entities.”).
86. Id.
87. See generally Serving the Public, SNCF, http://www.sncf.com/sncv1/
en/meet-sncf/epic-status (describing an EPIC).
88. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1522-1 (Fr.).
89. France nationalized Renault in 1945, Charbonnages de France,
Electricité de France, and Gaz de France in 1946, and for a brief time under the
presidency of Mitterrand, France also nationalized a large part of the banking
sector and industries of strategic importance to the state (1982–1986). See Paul
Cohen, Lessons from the Nationalization Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in
France, DISSENT MAG., Winter 2010, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/
lessons-from-the-nationalization-nation-state-owned-enterprises-in-france.
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competition (e.g., France Telecom) and to reduce the budget
deficit to slow the progression of the French public debt.90 For
listed companies, the state gradually reduced its participation
by small successive sales. These SOEs include:
 Thales: In December 2015, the public sector accounts for
26% of the shares, the individual and institutional
shareholder accounts for 46% of the shares;91
 SNPE: 100% in 2005, total current privatization in 2011;92
 Areva: 95% in 2005, 28.83% in 201793 and
 EDF: 100% in 2005, 84.94% in 2017.94
Many public companies are owned by local authorities; for
example, the City of Paris owns eighteen semi-public
companies.95 Local authorities sometimes undertake joint
control with the state, as in the case of the Compagnie Nationale
du Rhône (CNR).96
II. THE REGULATION OF STATE CAPITALISM
INVESTMENTS
State capitalism is diverse and on the rise. Practically, it
means that the volume of international investments made by
SCEs is increasing, thus rendering international norms on the
protection of foreign investment increasingly significant.
International investment law provides rules to ensure access for
foreign investment to host country markets and to protect
90. See Mojuyé, supra note 31, at 81.
91. Shareholders and Board of Directors, THALES, https://www.thales
group.com/en/global/corporate-responsibility/governance/shareholders-andboard-directors (last visited May 5, 2018).
92. See Michel Berne & Gérard Pogorel, Privatization Experience in France,
in CEDIFO DICE REP. 36, table 3 (2005), https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/
dicereport105-forum5.pdf. See also http://www.privatizationbarometer.com/
database.php (last visit 14 Apr. 2018).
93. Berne & Pogorel, supra note 92; France - 7-State-Owned Enterprises
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=France-Competition-fromState-Owned-Enterprises.
94. Berne & Pogorel, supra note 92; France - 7-State-Owned Enterprises,
supra note 93.
95. See Real Estate Dev. Servs., Mixed Economy Companies, Local Public
Companies and Public Companies: Local Development City of Paris (2016) (in
French) https://api-site-cdn.paris.fr/images/98230.
96. See Vincent Guérard & Vincent Trévisani, L’ouverture a la concurrence
du marché français de l’éctricité: une révolution en marche [The Opening of the
French Electricity Market to Competition: A Revolution is Underway], 2 INT’L
BUS. L.J. 123, 131 (2003); see also Mojuyé, supra note 31.
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investment against risk (especially political risk). It creates a
specific set of investment protection obligations on host
countries, including protection against expropriation without
compensation and it gives access to financial compensation
through investor–state arbitration when the host country has
breached a protection obligation.97
Unfortunately, as of today, there is no comprehensive
multilateral agreements on investment, either under the ambit
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or anywhere else. Under
the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, the possibility of
negotiations on investment was originally included in 2001 but
it was dropped in 2004.98 There was a prior attempt to negotiate
a multilateral investment agreement (MIA) between OECD
countries as a plurilateral agreement, but these negotiations
ended without success in 1997.99 Hence, international rules on
investment are fragmented and there are a wide variety of
obligations. Customary international law100 is applicable to
investment but its content is limited and disputed. The WTO
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement does
mention investment, but it is a very limited agreement, dealing
only with investment rules that have an impact on trade in goods
that is contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).101 It mainly prohibits performance requirements that
are contrary to national treatment (NT) of goods (such as local
sourcing requirements) or by the creation of a quota on goods.102
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
under Mode-3 Commitments on commercial presence, applies to
some kinds of investment in services.103 The main source of
97. See also OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in
International Investment Law (OECD Working Papers on International
Investment, Paper No. 3, 2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentpolicy/WP-2004_3.pdf.
98. General Council, Decision on the Doha Work Programme, ¶ 1(g), WTO
Doc. WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
99. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/globalization-of-the-economy-21/multilateral-agreement-on-investment-2-5.html.
100. Customary international law is the law that develops from the
consistent practice of states that have an appropriate sense of legal obligation.
See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of
Foreign Investment, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 691 (2007).
101. See Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, WORLD TRADE
ORG. [WTO], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm.
102. Id.
103. See The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives,
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international investment law is contained in other treaties,
sometimes called IIAs, which include Preferential Trade and
Investment Agreements (PTIAs) that address investment, and
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). These provide more
comprehensive rules on investment. IIAs also include double
taxation agreements (DTAs).104
A. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
In principle, the treatment of international investment is
defined by domestic law, that is to say the law of the state of the
investment of territoriality.105 Thus, an investment host state
makes the rules and regulations applicable to investments
according to the desired orientation, incentive, or disincentive.
Exporting countries of investment, for most developed countries
are favorable to domestic law mechanisms because they allow
them greater concessions in terms of treatment and protection
from the state of territoriality.106 For their part, importing
Coverages, and Disciplines, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
gatsqa_e.htm.
104. Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An
Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS xxvii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). See
generally Zachary Elkins et. al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 814–15 (2006) (“The United
States embraced BITs later than did its West European counterparts. Between
1962 and 1972, during which time West Germany entered into forty-six BITs
and Switzerland entered into twenty-seven, the United States eschewed such
treaties and signed only two Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties—
with Togo and Thailand. One reason for the delayed U.S. participation in
bilateral arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral
approach. The United States was one of the most aggressive proponents of the
Hull Rule and may have feared that BITs represented a threat to its claim that
investment was already protected under customary international law.
Moreover, potential hosts may have had incentives to resist the relatively
onerous provisions the United States government typically tried to secure. One
of the prime differences between the terms typically offered by the Europeans
and the United States at this time was the former’s emphasis on investment
protection and the latter’s additional insistence on liberalization.”).
105. For a critical account of the current investment arbitration regime, see
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 19 (2008); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES (2009). See also, Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration,
Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
106. See generally Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An
Examination of The Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule
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countries investments, often those of developing countries, are
favorable to the mechanisms of international law, because the
use of an international interest allows them to mitigate the
concessions would welcome the state of nationality
investment.107 This feature was debated in a lively way during
the 1960s, and it was the cause of the proliferation of
conventional instruments on the treatment and protection of
investments.108 In general, a treaty invariably stipulates that
the host country should pay for investment once it is established
in its territory. Very often bilateral treaties include one or more
general principles, together or individually, which are intended
to provide global criteria through which it is possible to judge
whether the treatment accorded to an investment is satisfactory;
the principles also help to interpret special situations when
applied to more specific provisions.109 The treatment of
investments is defined as “the set of principles and rules of
international law as national law governing the regime of
international investment, since the moment of its formation
until its liquidation.”110

of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL., 1151 (2013) (discussing the existing models
of interaction between BITs and domestic rule of law, including the complement
model, the substitute model and the limits of both). See also Richard C. Chen,
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic Institutional Reform, 55 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 547 (2016-2017).
107. See S.K. Dholakia, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing
Countries: What Now and What Next - Impact of White Industries v. Coal India
Award, 2 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 4 (2013). See also Eric Gottwald, Leveling the
Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 237 (2006-2007).
108. See, e.g. M. Sornarajah, The New International Economic Order,
Investment Treaties and Foreign Investment Law in ASEAN, 27 Malaya L. Rev.
440 (1985).
109. See, e.g. JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER
INVESTMENT TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2014); Lorenzo
Cotula, Do Investment Treaty Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space?, QUESTIONS
OF INT’L L. 9 (2014); J. PEDRO MARTINEZ-FRAGA & C. RYAN REETZ, PUBLIC
PURPOSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY IN
THE GLOBAL ERA (2014); William Schreiber, Realizing the Right to Water in
International Investment Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach to bit
Obligations, 48 (1) NAT. RESOURCES J. 431 (2008); Howard Mann, Implications
of International Trade and Investment Agreements for Water and Water
Services: Some Responses from Other Sources of International Law, 5
Transnational Dispute Management (2006); Gus Van Harten, Five
Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 (1) TRADE, L. &
DEV. 19 (2010).
110. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on
Domestic Administrative Law, 37(4) N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 953,954 (2005).
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The general standards of treatment found systematically in
a bilateral agreement include absolute norms and standards.111
This generally means that the absolute standards are those that
set out the treatment to be given.112 The standards define the
required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to
other investments. However, it should be noted that “absolute”
terms and “relative” terms are not universally accepted.
Generally, bilateral treaties can therefore include several
provisions on absolute standards for the treatment to be
accorded. BITs provide several clauses that are part of the
absolute standard of treatment accorded to investments.113
These provisions for the FET, full protection and security, the
prohibition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures and
treatment in accordance with international law, and one or more
provisions relating to the treatment.114 BITs use two different
terms in order to prevent the discriminatory treatment of
investments. These are the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause
and the NT standard. We discuss below the applicability of these
two types of treatment in bilateral treaties, as well as exceptions
to these two treatment standards.115
A major reason why many developed countries took the
initiative to conclude bilateral treaties during the 1960s was to
protect their investments abroad. Investment protection is
defined as “the set of principles and rules of international law as
of national law, which have the object or effect of preventing or
suppressing any public affect the existence or the consistency of

111. See Stephen Jagusch & Nicole Duclos, Compensation for the Breach of
Relative Standards of Treaty Protection, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 515, 516
(2009).
112. Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment
Law: Investment Tribunals’ Perspective, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY
AND SUBSIDIARITY 323, 324–5 (T. Broude & Y. Shany eds., Hart 2008).
113. See Jesse Kennedy, Autocatalysis in Investment Treaty Law, 47 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 1035 (2015-2016).
114. See id.; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201 (1988).
115. See Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate
Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and
Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225 (2015). See also Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT
Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their Coverage, the Impact of
Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defense of Necessity, 28 ICSID REV.
351, 382 (2013); see also Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International
Investment and Domestic Health Protections—Is a General Exceptions Clause
as a Forced Perspective, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 358–59 (2013).
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international investment.”116 The protection regime is
intimately linked to the notion of permanent sovereignty, and its
rules and principles laid down by the domestic law of the state
of the investment of territoriality, cover all the problems of
expropriation and nationalization. Thus, the States of investors,
especially in developed countries, do not want to depend on
choices made by the South. Therefore, the clauses designed to
protect investments in the bilateral treaties are of particular
importance. These are, in general, the provisions designed: (1) to
prevent investments against expropriation; (2) against war and
civil unrest; (3) for the transfer of payments; (4) for specific
protection clauses; and (5) also other provisions concerning the
general exceptions.
This increased importance of IIAs necessitates an
understanding of the scope of their application, with which a
state must comply. The most important issues of comprehension
related to the scope of application in IIAs include the following:
what is the definition of “investor” and “investment?117 When
116. Julien Chaisse & Lisa Li, Shareholder Protection Reloaded Redesigning
The Matrix Of Shareholder Claims For Reflective Loss, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51,
61 (2016).
117. Treaty obligations only apply to the “investments” of “investors,” as
defined in the treaty. Julien Chaisse, Renewables Re-energized? The
Internationalization of Green Energy Investment Rules and Disputes,
9 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 269 (2016). The key question is: who is an
investor and what is an investment? To address this question, countries should
think about the following issues: What kind of investments will benefit from the
treaty obligation? Generally, capital exporting states would like to have a broad
definition to ensure that their investors are protected regardless of the form of
their investment. Host states may be concerned that a broad definition of
investment may create a substantial risk of investor–state claims. Host states
may also be concerned about whether there are any areas of state policy that
would be affected by the scope of the definition. For example, some countries
would not like to include state debt obligations in order to have flexibility to
deal with such obligations in the face of a balance-of-payments crisis. What type
of investment would a state like to attract? Does a host state want to attract
FDI or portfolio or both? Most IIA definitions extend the scope of the agreement
to a much broader conception of investment. Commonly a broad definition is
adopted in IIAs which is called an “Open Ended Definition” that includes every
kind of asset (even intellectual property, etc.). More recently a “Closed Ended
Definition” has also been introduced in IIAs which limits investment to
categories that are specified in a list. In such cases, however, sometimes the list
could be quite long. In both cases, the definition may or may not require that
investment must possess the characteristics of classical concept of investment
to qualify for protection. The Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership
2007 does require that some of these characteristics are present. See MalaysiaPakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Malaysia-Pak., art. 88(1)(d),
Nov. 8, 2007, http://fta.miti.gov.my/miti-fta/resources/auto%20download%20
images/55892379ea5d1.pdf (“Where an asset lacks the characteristics of an
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should the treaty obligations start? Does the treaty cover only
new investments after the treaty is in place, or is it also valid for
existing investments? When does the treaty obligation end?
Upon termination of the treaty should the obligations end or
continue for a specified period of time for existing investments?
B. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
(GATS)
As discussed in the Introduction, the controversy over SCEs
is essentially about the interaction of two very different concepts
of the role of government in a capitalist economy, i.e., state
capitalism as opposed to market capitalism. There is a potential
for abuse or corruption where elements of state capitalism
interfere in a tradition of market capitalism. This may arguably
be created by the greater proximity an SCE creates between
governments and the private sector. This particularly applies to
services like banks.118 If an SCE cannot directly rely on the WTO
dispute procedure, its close connection to the government may
be presumed as rendering the claim natural by its government
against a host country.119
investment, that asset is not an investment regardless of the form it may take.
The characteristics of an investment include the commitment of capital, the
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”). Article 88 requires
that in addition to Open Ended Definition, there is a Qualification Note to be
applied for eligibility of an investment. Id.
118. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) has already strongly invested
in this financial sector; a growing network of interlinked investments between
banks and other financial firms within China and overseas can be assumed. In
practice, CIC’s investment in companies such as Morgan Stanley may provide
them with unfair preferential access to China’s domestic financial markets, or,
in return, overseas financial firms may be put under pressure to treat Chinese
companies in global business preferentially compared to others. Neutrality of
the business sector and a level playing field for MNEs worldwide is at stake.
Julien Chaisse et al., Managing India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve: Managing
India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve: An Exploration of the SWF Temptation,
INDIAN J. INT’L ECON. L. 2010 (3), 20.
119. The WTO agreements provide extensive rights and impose many
obligations on its members and on their conduct of international trade. A key
issue is how the WTO assesses and enforces those rights and duties. A critical
part of any enforcement mechanism is an effective system to resolve disputes
over what the rules mean and whether they have been broken in a specific case.
This is essential to promote compliance with these rules. Article XXIII of the
GATT 1994 and the DSU set out the basic institutional and jurisdictional scope
of WTO dispute resolution. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art.
23, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153, https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]; see also Understanding
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There is little doubt that WTO GATS does apply to potential
SCEs’ investments. The GATS mostly concerns investment
issues of all the existing WTO agreements. Although GATS does
not deal officially with investment, it covers FDI through its
commercial presence.120 This Section will answer two questions:
does the GATS apply to SCE operations, and, if yes, is it possible
to have investment disputes at the WTO?
Also, some countries have explicitly excluded foreign
government ownership from the scope of their GATS
commitments in a few sectors. The United States’ commitment
states that government-owned or government-controlled
insurance companies, whether domestic or foreign, are not
authorized to conduct business in a large number of states, and
in basic telecommunications, radio, and television broadcast
services licenses may not be granted to or held by foreign
governments or the representatives thereof.121 In the sector of
audiovisual services and the sub-sector of “Radio and Television
Transmission Services.” the United States has set some
restrictions on the nature of the foreign investors, and these
implicitly exclude SOEs from the said sector.122 The United
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, annex II, Apr.
15 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf. The latter
document has established a unified and compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism for all covered agreements adopted under the umbrella of the WTO.
Id. It comprehensively codifies the relevant procedural rules and guidelines.
The same core principles apply to any dispute across all agreements and
subject-matters (with only few exceptions of special or additional rules
contained in covered agreements applicable as lex specialis only to disputes
arising under that agreement). Fundamentally, the mechanism is explicitly
designed to promote the rule of law and to provide security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system. Hence, it ensures that the approach taken
by panels and the Appellate Body is of an essentially legal nature. The WTO
does not grant direct access to its work or meetings for any actor other than the
members. This holds equally true for dispute settlement proceedings to which
only members can formally become a party. Private actors and individuals such
as industries, consumers and NGOs cannot initiate a formal dispute resolution
proceeding, let alone have standing before panels or the Appellate Body.
Governments alone decide whether a complaint shall be brought before the
WTO dispute settlement system. This mechanism reflects classical diplomatic
protection of individuals and groups by nation states as developed under
general public international law.
120. The GATS modes of supply are: cross-border supply, consumption
abroad, commercial presence, and the movement of natural persons. See Modes
of Supply, UN TRADE STATISTICS, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50665/Modes-of-Supply.
121. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, U.S. SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS UNDER
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 55 (1998).
122. Id. at 47.
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States schedules state:
Radio and television licences may not be held by: a
foreign government; a corporation chartered under the
law of a foreign country or which has a non-U.S. citizen
as an officer or director or more than 20 per cent of the
capital stock of which is owned or voted by non-U.S.
citizens; a corporation chartered under the laws of the
United States that is directly or indirectly controlled by
a corporation more than 25 per cent of whose capital
stock is owned by non-U.S. citizens or a foreign
government or a corporation of which any officer or more
than 25 per cent of the directors are non-US citizens.123
In the sector of financial services, as with all subsectors,
“[f]oreign ownership of Edge corporations is limited to foreign
banks and US subsidiaries of foreign banks, while domestic nonbank firms may own such corporations.”124
The establishment of a commercial presence relates
substantially and directly to investment. As long as a SCE
decides to invest in a WTO country member (i.e., the United
States or the EU), and if it is in the services sector, GATS is a
relevant legal instrument to use.
It is only by reference to a country’s schedule, and its MFN
exemption list, that it can be seen which services sectors and
under what conditions the basic principles of the GATS (Market
access, NT, and MFN treatment) apply within that country’s
jurisdiction. A specific commitment in a services schedule is an
undertaking to provide market access and NT for the service
activity in question on the terms and conditions specified in the
schedule.125 The commitments made in the field of “commercial
presence” are important since with the constitutional principle
of obligation, parties to GATS are committed to treating services
and service providers from one member in a no less favorable
way than like services and service providers from any other as
concerns measures affecting trade in services.126 NT is, however,
123. Id. at 48.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2018).
126. The wording of MFN treatment in GATS is the same as in NAFTA and
the United States BITs, using the negative list approach, once it states that
with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each member shall
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not automatically accorded across the board. It applies only for
scheduled sectors when the parties agree to provide NT in the
context of specific market access commitments.127 GATS also
states that a member may maintain a measure inconsistent with
MFN treatment provided that such a measure is listed in, and
meets the conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions.128
The GATS does not set out any operational conditions
directly. The host countries continue to regulate foreign
investment through their domestic legislation (as discussed
above) and not by directly imposing obligations on foreign
investors in IIAs. Nevertheless, there are some general
obligations within GATS that certainly affect the investment
operational conditions. Such obligations are: domestic
regulation, recognition, monopolies and exclusive service
suppliers, and business practice obligations.129
The domestic regulation affects the operation of investment
mostly through an authorization process, qualification
requirements, technical standards and licensing requirements,
where these conditions and procedures are required for the
supply of a service. The obligations of recognition affect
investment in the supply of a service, where services suppliers
need to meet standards or criteria for the authorization,
licensing, or certification of their services, or where they need to
achieve special education or experience.130 The obligation on
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers within the
Agreement states that each member shall ensure that any
monopoly supplier of a service in its territory does not act in a
manner inconsistent with the MFN treatment principle.131 If a
supplier fulfills the condition on monopoly and exclusive service
supplier, then this Agreement will certainly affect the operation
of his or her investment in order not to allow such a supplier to
abuse its monopoly position. Regarding the obligations on
business practices, the Agreement appeals the members to
eliminate certain business practices of service suppliers that
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any
other member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services
and service suppliers of any other country.
127. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Jan. 1, 1995, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
130. Id. art. 7.
131. Id. art. 8.
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may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services.
III.

STATE CONTROLLED ENTITIES AS
CLAIMANTS: LEGAL STANDING UNDER
INVESTMENT TREATIES

As this Article previously discussed, SCEs from China,
France and the United States are increasingly active in
transnational investment operations. Simultaneously, the role
of international investment agreements reaches a level never
known in its history. This creates new legal questions as none of
these rules of international law are designed to regulate foreign
public investments and indirectly the activities of SCEs. In
particular, the global regime for international investment was
not thought to be designed to allow SCEs to act as a claimant
before an international tribunal. However, that question is now
a reality, challenging the fundamentals of international law.
The Investor State Dispute Settlement is a particular
feature of IIAs which differentiates them from all other types of
treaties.132 Investors from one party state are permitted to seek
financial compensation from the other party state through
binding arbitration on the grounds that the other has failed to
comply with its obligations under the treaty.133
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the number of cases launched now
exceeds 550.134 These disputes have been filed with the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID)135 (or the ICSID Additional Facility) which has dealt
with the largest number of disputes.136 ICSID arbitration
132. See Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice, supra note 115.
133. It fulfills investors’ needs in the following ways. It avoids exposure of
the investor to the uncertainties of host state laws and regulation by creating a
separate treaty-based set of rules to govern host state’s conduct. It gives
investors an alternative to the host state’s judicial system to seek relief from
the host state’s actions. An investor can determine when there has been a
breach of a treaty obligation and launch a claim. It is unnecessary for an
investor to rely on its home state espousing its claim. There may be various
reasons why a state may not want to make a claim against another state in
diplomatic relations. Julien Chaisse & Dini Sejko, Investor-State Arbitration
Distorted: When the Claimant Is a State, in JUDGING THE STATE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: SOVEREIGNTY MODERN, THE
LAW AND THE ECONOMICS 86 (Leïla Choukroune ed. 2016).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 86 n.36.
136. Database of ICSID Member States, WORLD BANK, https://icsid.world
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possesses have several characteristics that make it particularly
attractive for investors. For instance, an ICSID award is not
subject to any review not foreseen in the ICSID Convention, and
it is to be recognized by the contracting states as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that state.137 In addition, host states have
a strong incentive to comply with ICSID awards because of the
institutional link of ICSID to the World Bank.138
The concept of ‘legal standing’ refers to the ability of a party
to demonstrate to the court/dispute resolution institution
sufficient connection to and harm from the law/treaty or action
challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.139
Most investment treaties offer a solution that gives independent
standing to shareholders: the treaties include shareholding or
participation in a company in their definition of ‘investment’.140
Mark Feldman identified that the disputes between investor and
State within the scope of investment treaty protections are
reflected in both the ICSID and in BITs.141 The ICSID was
intended to fill a narrow procedural gap that existed between
State-to-State and private disputes and facilitate the settlement
of disputes arising from private, but not public, foreign

bank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Nov. 4,
2007); Hernando Otero & Omar García-Bolívar, International Arbitration
between Foreign Investors and Host States, HAUSER GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL
PROGRAM
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/International_Arbitration_
Foreign_Investors_Host_States.html. See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 229, 231 (2004) (pointing out that most BITs refer to
ICSID). More than 140 states are parties to the ICSID Convention. List of
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, INTERNATIONAL
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Nov. 4, 2007),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%
20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20C
onvention%20-%20Latest.pdf. Investment disputes may also be settled under
the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the International
Chamber of Commerce, and ad-hoc arbitration.
137. See Chaisse & Sejko, supra note 133 , at 87.
138. See ICSID and the World Bank Group, ICSID, https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20Bank%20
Group.aspx (describing ICSID as one of the five organizations of the World
Bank).
139. See Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
140. See DOLZER & SCHRUER, supra note 105, at 57.
141. See Mark Feldman, The Standing of State-Owned Entities Under
Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
POLICY 615 (Andrew K. Bjorklund ed. 2012).
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investment.142 Therefore, the “legal standing” in the context of
investment arbitration is based on thousands of BITs and the
ICSID Convention. Those investment arbitrations are mostly to
take place in the ICSID (i.e. an international arbitration
institution which facilitates legal dispute resolution and
conciliation between international investors). In this Section,
the Article reviews the most important cases brought to
arbitration dealing with the issue of SCEs legal standing (For a
detailed summary of all cases, including pending cases, see
Annex 1).
Standing is a material question in all cases. SCEs may be
reluctant to submit disputes to such arbitral panels without
assurances that the panels would confer jurisdiction. By way of
example, Temasek Holdings, the sovereign wealth arm of
Singapore, apparently chose not to submit a dispute with
Indonesia over telecom investments to an international
investment dispute process despite (a) the existence of a BIT
between the two states, and (b) the implication in the new
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement that sovereign
wealth fund investors should be treated similarly to private
foreign investors for BIT purposes.143
A. AN INVESTOR BY ANY NAME?
One of the most important issues in an investment treaty is
to define who is an investor whose rights are protected under the
treaty.144 Investors must be related to the state party to the
treaty other than the one complained against. This arrangement
must be the case to benefit from the investor protection
obligations in the host state.145 The issue to be addressed is what
142. See id.
143. See, e.g., P.R. Venkat, Indonesia Fines Temasek $1.7 Million, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/indonesia-fines-temasek17-million-2011-01-18 (reporting on the result of Temasek’s submission of
claims to an Indonesian domestic court).
144. For an example definition of “investor” see Agreement Between the
Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-S. Afr., art. I, Nov. 27, 1995,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CAN_Southafrica_e.
asp.
145. BITs offer foreign investors a unique dispute settlement mechanism to
enforce the rights given to them by the investment treaties. This unique
element of investment treaties provides an investor with the possibility of
bringing a direct claim against the host state in an international arbitration
forum, such as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
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connection between an investor and a state is required.
Typically, for natural persons, a national of a state party to the
treaty or a citizen of the state is considered to be an investor of
that state. The nationality is determined by the law of the state
whose nationality is to be claimed to the extent not addressed in
the treaty. Dual nationality, like in the case of many developing
countries, may be permitted by state law. The possibility of dual
nationality raises the question of whether dual nationals are
allowed to be protected under the treaty if they have the
nationality of the host state. The majority of treaties do not give
an answer to this but provide a way to analyze this question. For
example, treaties ask which state a person has the most
substantial connection as a way of defining nationality for the
purposes of the treaty. Residency in a specific state is typically
not required.146
The next issue is what or who is a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation? IIAs typically require that a legal person
be incorporated or organized under the domestic laws of a party
to claim its nationality.147 It is quite simple for foreigners to meet
this condition and to therefore qualify for treaty protection. It is
also easy for host states to determine whether a person legally
qualifies for protection. The problems with such a definition is
that it leads to very broad protection, and thus it may need to be
confined with some conditions. This need depends on the
domestic policy of the host state. Some states may not want
further limits because they may want to make it as easy as
possible for investors to qualify for protection under the treaty.
Other states may be concerned about “treaty shopping.” Where
simple incorporation in a country gives an investor the
nationality of that country there is a risk that investors may take
advantage of treaty protection. They could do this by simply
incorporating a subsidiary in one party state for the purpose of
making an investment in another party state. A domestic
(ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). A discriminatory act
against an SWF can be followed by a direct claim by the SWF against the host
state based on the applicable investment treaty between the host state and the
home state of the SWF. Assuming successful passage through any jurisdictional
challenges, an arbitration forum will have to decide whether the legislative or
executive act can be considered a discriminatory measure that violates an
investor protection standard. See Chaisse & Sejko, supra note 133, at 88.
146. See Agreement Between Canada and South Africa, supra note 144.
147. Chaisse & Sejko, Investor-State Arbitration Distorted: When the
Claimant Is a State, in JUDGING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LAW: SOVEREIGNTY MODERN, THE LAW AND THE ECONOMICS,
supra note 133, at 589.
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investor in one party state could even seek the protection of the
treaty against its own government by channeling an investment
through a subsidiary in the other party state back into the first
party state. Some countries, like Mauritius, that want to be
international business hubs are not concerned about this
problem, but other countries may want to manage their exposure
to treaty obligations and are interested in targeting only a
narrow class of investors.148
Another alternative to address treaty shopping is a “denial
of benefits” provision. Instead of incorporating requirements in
the treaty definition of investor, a host state can deny the
benefits of a treaty with a denial of benefits provision if
particular criteria, such as seat, ultimate ownership, or
substantial business presence in a party state, cannot be
established by the investor.149 For example in Phoenix Action, an
investor who was a Czech national had a dispute with the Czech
government.150 He subsequently incorporated a corporation in
Israel and transferred his investment to the Israeli corporation
with the goal of making the investment eligible for protection
under the Czech–Israel BIT.151 As an Israeli firm, that investor
launched a claim against the Czech Republic.152 A hypothetical
denial of benefits provision that contained a substantial
“business activity in Israel” requirement could have been used
to deny the benefits of the treaty to the investor.153 Some cases
148. To avoid treaty shopping, certain limitations are used in IIAs: (1) they
require the ultimate owners who control investment to be nationals of the home
state party. This is a rare approach in IIAs but would avoid misuse of protection.
Such an approach is used in the Germany–Antigua and Barbuda BIT. TNCs
often have quite complex structures making it difficult to determine where
ultimate control resides, and (2) they require a legal person to have substantial
business activity, or its seat (location of effective management), head office or
some other significant connection in a state party. This is a common approach
adopted in IIAs, but it is quite vague leading to uncertainty when the issue is
addressed in investor–state tribunals. Sometimes tribunals, in interpreting the
requirement for the seat to be in a party state have required a minimal
connection. For example, in one case it was held that if one director is resident
in the jurisdiction and the corporation files its financial statement in that
country, the seat of the corporation is in that country. Hence the application of
this requirement can be hard to predict in practice.
149. Lindsay Gastrell & Paul-Jean Le Cannu, Procedural Requirements of
‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Review of Arbitral
Decisions, 30 ICSID REV. 78, 79 (2015).
150. Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award,
¶ 2 (Apr. 15, 2009).
151. Id. ¶ 22.
152. Id. ¶ 6.
153. See id. ¶ 38.
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have interpreted denial of benefits provisions as requiring that
states must give notice of a denial of benefits before a claim is
filed. Whether this is a requirement will depend on how a “denial
of benefits” provision is drafted.
IIAs, being instruments of cooperation for the promotion,
protection, and liberalization of foreign investment, have
increased over recent years, and they grant rights to SCEs as
long as they are “qualified investors,” as defined in the IIA. The
legal framework of investment agreements has also evolved
significantly, and thus the accompanying jurisprudence raises
new questions about the interpretation and implementation of
IIAs for governments and investors both in developed and
developing countries. One feature of many investment
agreements that have contributed to calls for a balancing of
investor rights with responsibilities has been the grant of direct
legal personality to investors; i.e., enabling them to mount an
international arbitration against host states. Most recent
investment agreements provide recourse to so-called investor–
state arbitration.154 If SCEs can operate as “qualified investors,”
then the main question is whether SCEs can successfully use the
investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, or whether they
have to rely on traditional state-to-state channels. I will deal
with the specific case of ICSID in a subsequent section.
BITs or preferential trade agreements (PTAs) apply only to
investments made by “investors” of one of the contracting parties
in the territory of the other party.155 Most BITs have
traditionally included a definition of “investor,” which covers
both natural and legal persons.156 Concerning natural persons
(which is relevant only when discussing SCEs), most IIAs protect
persons who have the nationality of one of the contracting
parties. Thus, the typical definition of a national of a state party
is a natural person recognized by that party’s internal law as a
national or citizen.157 Investments made by persons not covered
154. Gastrell & Cannu, supra note 149, at 84.
(Oct.
11,
2014),
155. The
Arbitration
Game,
ECONOMIST
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration.
156. See SUZY H. NIKIÈMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BEST
PRACTICES DEFINITION OF INVESTOR 1 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/
best_practices_definition_of_investor.pdf.
157. Sometimes, the “investor” definition is broadened to include not only
citizens but also individuals who qualify as permanent residents under
domestic law. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and
the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,

2018]

STATE CAPITALISM ON THE ASCENT

377

under that definition will fall outside of the scope of the
agreement. The definition of “investor” specifies what types of
legal entities are covered. Such a provision helps to answer
whether an SCE is covered in a specific situation because either
there is an explicit mention or there is none.
1. State-controlled Entities Explicitly Covered Investors
During the United States’ preparation of the new 2012
United States BIT model,158 there was considerable discussion
about extending the coverage of BIT investment protections to
state-owned enterprises. Only one change from the 2004 Model
BIT was made in response to those discussions. The only
modification was to include a footnote to Article 2.2(a) making it
clear that the application of the substantive obligations of the
BIT “to a state enterprise or other person when it exercises any
regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority
delegated to it by that Party” covered government delegations
effected by a wide variety of regulatory means, including the
broad term “party action.”159 This language aims to address
concerns that governments can delegate such governmental
authority to state-owned enterprises through less formal means,
even though the state-owned enterprise is effectively acting as a
government entity at the government’s effective delegation. Of
course, evidentiary proof of such an allegation will be a challenge
in most circumstances. The United States government declined
to adopt proposals for an inward screening mechanism for
investments by state-owned enterprises or to regulate the
competitive activities of state-owned enterprises under the BIT
even when acting in a commercial manner.160
H.K.-Austl., art. 1(f)(i)(A), Sept. 15, 1993, [1993] ATS 30. Natural persons
having the nationality of both BIT parties under their respective laws: One
possibility, following the international law principle of an effective link, is to
consider a person as a national of the country of his/her dominant and effective
nationality.
158. The United States concludes all of its BITs based on a model. The U.S.
Department of State and the United States Trade Representative along with
other agencies completed a 2012 Model BIT. See Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit (last
visited July 31, 2015). For the text of the 2012 Model BIT, see also 2012 U.S.
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter
2012 Model BIT].
159. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 158, art. 2(a), n.8.
160. Charlene Barshefsky et al., United States to Resume Bilateral
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The recent result of the United States’ attempts to refine the
definition of “investor” and to decide whether SCEs should be
explicitly incorporated is not surprising. Other treaties do
provide an explicit reference to SCEs. For instance, a provision
relevant to the issues of ownership and control presented in this
case is Article 1139 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which defines “investment of an investor
of a Party” as follows:
[I]nvestment of an investor of a Party means an
investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
an investor of such Party. Investor of a Party means a
Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an
enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making
or has made an investment.161
In the BIT between the United Arab Emirates and South
Korea (2004), Article 1.3 reads “investors” to mean any natural
or juridical persons of one Contracting Party, governmental or
private, who invest in the territory of the other Contracting
Party: (a) the term “natural persons” means natural persons
having the nationality of one Contracting Party in accordance
with its laws; and (b) the term “juridical persons” means any
entity such as companies, public institutions, authorities,
foundations, partnerships, firms, establishments, organizations,
corporations or associations, incorporated or constituted in
accordance with the laws and regulations of one Contracting
Party.”162 Similarly, Article 1.4 of the United Arab Emirates–
Finland 2005 BIT explicitly mentioned financial institutions and
investment authorities as protected foreign investors. According
to Article 1 of this treaty, “[t]he term investor means ‘The
government of the contracting state and any other legal person,
such as public and private companies, financial institutions and
investment authorities, having its seat in the territory of either
Investment Treaty Negotiations on the Basis of a Revised Model Treaty,
WILMERHALE (May 15, 2012), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=89748.
161. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1139, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 , 648 art. 1139 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
162. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the
Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, S. Kor-U.A.E., art. 1.3, June 9, 2002, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/49761/Part/I-49761-080000028033111c.pdf.
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contracting state.”163
2. State-controlled Entities Not Explicitly Covered Investors
Although some treaties may explicitly refer to SCEs, a large
majority of IIAs simply do not make any mention of them
generating some ambiguity as for the applicability of investment
treaties to SCEs.164 In this situation, one may be tempted to
follow a strict logic and conclude that if state entities are not
mentioned among the investors covered by the treaty, they
should not be protected by the treaty. A key legal argument
would be that a state operating as an economic actor is in any
case protected by the customary rules of international law.
However, in the absence of an explicit mention of SCEs,
ambiguity can only be settled by proper tribunal interpretation.
B. THE TREATMENT OF SCES CLAIMS BY INVESTMENT
TRIBUNALS
One feature of many IIAs that has contributed to calls for a
balancing of investor rights with responsibilities has been the
grant of direct legal personality to investors, enabling them to
mount international arbitrations against host states. Most
recent investment agreements provide recourse to so-called
investor-state arbitration “which entitles an injured investor to
sue the host government for damages because of a violation
of treaty standards and rights.”165 This novel device has
permitted investors to challenge government measures, policies
or actions which are thought to contravene the substantive
provisions of a given treaty.

163. Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of
the United Arab Emirates on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Fin.-U.A.E., art. 1.4(a), Apr. 12, 1996, 1981 U.N.T.S. 116.
164. For example in the Singapore–PRC BIT 1985 the definition of juridical
person does not explicitly include SCEs as investors covered by the treaty. The
definition covers only companies and it means: “(a) in respect of the People’s
Republic of China, a company or other juridical person incorporated or
constituted in its territory in accordance with its laws; (b) in respect of
Singapore, any company, firm, association or body, with or without legal
personality, incorporated, established or registered under the laws in force in
the Republic of Singapore.” Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, China-Sing. art 1, Nov. 21, 1985, 1986 U.N.T.S. 293.
165. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51
HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 446 (2010).
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The investor–state mechanism has given rise to a
substantial volume of litigation in recent years. In stark
contrast, the WTO dispute settlement rules are exclusively
reserved for state-to-state disputes. On the basis of investorstate arbitration provisions, disputes between a state party and
an investor national of the other state are settled by
international arbitration rather than by the domestic courts of
the host state (as would be the case otherwise). The host
government’s consent to the jurisdiction of an international
arbitration tribunal is granted ex ante in the form of an open
offer in either the investment treaty or in its national law. Over
the last few years, investment disputes brought before
international arbitrators have multiplied, and they have
attracted attention by reason of the significant compensations
host states have had to pay in some instances.166
1. A Review of Cases Filed by SCEs
This Section offers a review of the case law dealing with
SCEs and SWFs. Although there are not many cases, this section
focuses on the most important cases. Those cases mentioned in
this section can foster a better understanding of how SCEs have
been treated by the tribunals. There are in total nine investment
claims which have been filed by SCEs (see Annex 1). The present
Section only reviews decided cases. Among them, the most
interesting are the four following awards: Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka, A. S. v. The Slovak Republic,167 Hrvatska
Rumeli
Telekom
v.
Electroprivreda
v.
Slovenia,168
169
and Telenor Mobile Communications v.
Kazakhstan,
Hungary.170
166. One notable example is the case of CME Czech Republic v. Czech
Republic, a UNCITRAL arbitration under the Netherlands–Czech Republic
BIT, which resulted in an award and payment of $269 million plus interest to
an injured investor, one of the largest awards ever made in an arbitration
proceeding. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (UNICITRAL),
Final Award, ¶ 650 (Mar. 14, 2003); Peter S. Green, Czech Republic Pays $355
Million to Media Concern, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/05/16/business/czech-republic-pays-355-million-to-media-concern.html.
167. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Award (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008).
168. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/24, Award of the Tribunal (Dec. 17, 2015).
169. Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award
(July 29, 2008).
170. Telenor Mobile Communications v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No.
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Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S. (CSOB) v. The
Slovak Republic (Slovakia) is a case involving a dispute related
to an international investment agreement before the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID).171 CSOB claimed that Slovakia breached the
“Agreement on the Basic Principles of a Financial Consolidation
of Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S.” (Consolidation
Agreement).172 The breach consisted of the failure by Slovakia to
cover the losses incurred by the Slovenska inkasni spol. s. r. o.
(Slovak Collection Company).173 CSOB required the respondent
to fulfill the Consolidation Agreement: i.e., to pay the damages
for the losses and cover the costs.174 Meanwhile, Slovakia
claimed that the Claimant lacked jurisdiction to claim this by
applying Article 25. 1 ICSID Convention.175 The issue of
jurisdiction was the main legal issue that needed to be tackled
by the Tribunal, as Article 25 ICSID only allows disputes
“between a Contracting State and a national of another
Contracting State.”176 Therefore, in this case, a key legal issue
that arose was whether CSOB merely an agent of the Czech
Republic or not.177 Another key legal issue was whether CSOB
was a qualified investor, and if so, why it was a qualified
investor.178 On May 24, 1999, the Tribunal unanimously found
that the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Centre and
the competence of the Tribunal.179 The necessary order for the
continuation of the proceedings on the merits would be issued.180
Also, the Tribunal granted the request and recommended the
suspension of the bankruptcy proceedings.181 In its reasoning,
ARB/04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 173 (2016).
171. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, 13 ICSID Rep. 183 ¶ 1.
172. Id. ¶ 1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (May 24, 1999),5 ICSID Rep. 335,
338.
176. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 25, Apr. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
177. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶¶ 27–37 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008).
178. See id.
179. Id. ¶ 3.
180. See id. ¶ 5.
181. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 9 (May 24, 1999), 5 ICSID
Rep. 335, 338 (“[T]o the extent that such proceedings might include
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the Tribunal stated that what mattered was the nature of the
activities and not their purpose.182 This case widens the scope of
application of BITs and ICSID, which means that it widens the
potential application of international investment law.
Hrvatska Electroprivreda (HEP) v. Slovenia is another case
that involved a dispute related to an international investment
agreement before the ICSID.183 The dispute between HEP and
Slovenia was about the ownership and operation of the Krško
NPP, which is an important power resource for both countries.184
HEP was seeking compensation from the respondent for the
financial losses that suffered as a result of respondent’s failure
to resume deliveries of electricity from the Krško NPP to HEP.185
Also, HEP asserted a claim against respondent for breaching its
obligation under a2001 Agreement to restore electricity
deliveries to HEP from the Krško NPP by June 30, 2002.186
Issues of jurisdiction were not seriously contested between the
parties to this arbitration.187 On June 12, 2009, the majority of
the Tribunal found that the Republic of Slovenia was liable to
HEP for the financial value of undelivered electrical power from
July 1, 2002 to April 10, 2003.188 This case shows that statecontrolled entities can make claims as a qualified investor.
Rumeli Telekom (Rumeli) v. Kazakhstan was a case which
involved a dispute before the ICSID related to an investment
contract.189 Rumeli argued that Kazakhstan’s right to challenge
determinations as to whether the Slovenska inkasni spol. s.r.o. [Slovak
Collection Company] has a valid claim in the form of a right to receive funds
from the Slovak Republic to cover its losses as contemplated in the
Consolidation Agreement at issue in this arbitration.”) (citing Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 1 (Jan. 11, 1999)).
182. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶
51.
183. See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No
ARB/05/24, Treaty Interpretation, ¶¶ 6–15 (June 12, 2009).
184. Id. ¶ 6.
185. Id. ¶ 13.
186. Id. ¶ 15.
187. See id. ¶ 166 (“A threshold issue is whether under the 2001 Agreement,
to which only Croatia and Slovenia are parties, this Tribunal has jurisdiction
over the dispute presented to it. More precisely, can HEP bring this case against
the Republic of Slovenia and before us? Issues of jurisdiction were not seriously
contested between the parties to this arbitration; nevertheless, some questions
were asked and in any event the Tribunal is obliged to be satisfied of its
jurisdiction.”).
188. Id. ¶ 202.
189. See Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16,
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the termination should be denied, and the compensation was not
adequate because respondent wrongfully terminated the
investment contract.190 Rumeli argued the Kazakhstan should
be responsible for the termination of the investment contract
and liable for losses caused by it’s failure to follow the BIT (the
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Republic of Turkey concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, dated May 1, 1992).191 In this dispute,
the main legal issues were whether Rumeli was a qualified
investor and whether the state must benefit from its
expropriation.192 This was similar to Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka v. Slovakia.193 Article 25 ICSID was an important
provision in the dispute. On July 29, 2008, the Tribunal found
that the respondent breached its obligation by failing to follow
the BIT and that expropriation may occur without any benefit to
the State.194 The Tribunal also found that the claimant was a
qualified investor.195
2. Should SCEs Use the Investor-State Dispute Mechanism
or the State-to-State Dispute Mechanism?
The main question is whether public entities can use the
investor-state arbitration system or whether they have to use
the state-to-state mechanism. It is an open question as the
tribunal in Tulip v. Turkey Award held that there is no basis
under international law to conclude that ownership of a
corporate entity by the State triggers the presumption of
Statehood; whilst State ownership may, in certain
circumstances, be a factor relevant to the question of attribution,
it does not convert a separate corporate entity into an ‘organ” of

Award, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2008), (“On May 20, 1999, KaR-Tel and the Investment
Committee executed Contract N° 0123-05-99 . . . .”).
190. Id. ¶ 11.
191. Id. ¶ 12.
192. See id. ¶¶ 9–12.
193. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶¶ 27–37.
194. Rumeli Telekom, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 707 (“[T]hat the
expropriation was not directly for the benefit of the State but for the benefit of
Telecom Invest does not affect this conclusion, since, as the parties agree,
expropriation can exist despite there being no obvious benefit to the State
concerned.”).
195. Id. ¶¶ 333–36.

384

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2

the State.196 Actually, as stated in Electrabel v. Hungary
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, the fact
that a State acts through a state-owned or state-controlled
company over which it exercises some influence is, by itself,
insufficient for the acts of such entities to be attributed to the
State.197
In 2006, the Government of the Region of Kaliningrad
(Russian Federation) commenced arbitration proceedings
against Lithuania based on the bilateral investment treaty
between the Russian Federation and Lithuania.198 The
Government of the Region of Kaliningrad initiated arbitration,
under the rules of the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).199 The ICC arbitral
tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute
and that the application was unfounded.200 Kaliningrad alleged
that Lithuania was liable for expropriating the building owned
by the Kaliningrad government (it was seized by order of the
Lithuanian courts).201 The tribunal determined that the
Kaliningrad regional government qualified as an investor
196. Tulip Real Estate Investment v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/28, Award, ¶ 289 (Mar. 10, 2014); see also Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 69 (Oct. 12, 2005 (holding that legal
entities separate from the State are not organs of the State).
197. Electrabel v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.95 (Nov. 30, 2012).
198. In substance, the Government of the Region of Kaliningrad claimed
compensation for the expropriation of its assets further to the enforcement of a
2004 LCIA award which was rendered in favor of a Cyprus company against the
Region of Kaliningrad (Russian Federation) for its failure to reimburse a loan.
The 2004 LCIA award was enforced in Lithuania against two buildings that the
Region of Kaliningrad owned there what triggered the Government of the
Region of Kaliningrad claim before the ICC. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Nov. 18, 2010, 09/19535 (2010).
199. James Clark, Paris Court of Appeals Rules that Enforcement of an
Arbitration Award Did Not Amount to Expropriation Under a BIT, THOMSON
REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (Dec. 21, 2010).
200. Dmitry Davydenko, French Judgment Unenforceable Because of Lack of
Legal Certainty, CIS ARBITRATION FORUM (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.cis
arbitration.com/2015/03/30/french-judgment-unenforceable-because-of-lack-oflegal-certainty (“The Region applied to the Paris Appellate Court to set aside
the [ICC] award on jurisdiction but the Court rejected the claim. Furthermore,
the Court held that the Region as a “losing party” must pay EUR 150,000 to the
Republic of Lithuania under article 700 of the French Civil procedure code.
Article 700 of the French Civil procedure code establishes the general rules of
distribution of court expenses between the parties.”); see Kaliningrad Region v.
Lith., ICC, Final Award (not public), (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/
cases/593.
201. Davydenko, supra note 200.
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according to the definition contained in the treaty.202 The treaty
refers to Russian law for guidance as to which persons and
entities can be considered “investors.”203 This approach is sure
to be debated in future investment treaty arbitrations,
particularly given the large volumes of foreign investments
made in recent years by states or parastatal entities.
Telenor Mobile Communications A. S. v. The Republic of
Hungary is a case that involved a dispute related to a specific
Bilateral Agreement (2001) and Energy Charter Treaty before
the ICSID.204 Telenor claimed that Hungary should pay
damages for alleged losses, because respondent breached the
BIT in 2002 and 2003.205 Telenor wanted the respondent to
compensate their loss, which was caused by respondent’s failure
to follow the BIT.206 Meanwhile, the Republic of Hungary
claimed that the application treaty (i. e., Energy Charter Treaty)
limited ICSID’s jurisdiction to expropriation claims; the
claimant lacked standing and failed to establish a prima facie
case.207 In this dispute, the main legal issues that arose were
whether the MFN clause in the treaty extended the jurisdiction
of the tribunal to categories of disputes beyond those set out in
the treaty itself,208 and whether the claimant alleged facts
sufficient to make out a prima facie case. On September 13,
2006, the Tribunal dismissed the Telenor’s claim.209 The
Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the claim because none of the
allegations rose to the level of expropriation under international
law and the BIT limit jurisdiction to expropriation claims.210
Also, the claimant failed to establish a prima facie case.211 The
Tribunal set a standard of review for investment treaty claims
at the jurisdictional stage and confirmed the fundamental
importance of respecting limits placed by sovereign States on

202. See id.; Davydenko, supra note 200.
203. Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the
Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of the Investments, Lith.-Russ., art. 1(1)(b), June 29, 1999.
204. See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 16 (Sept. 13, 2006).
205. Id. ¶ 17.
206. See id. ¶ 17(1).
207. Id. ¶ 18.
208. See id. ¶ 20.
209. Id. ¶ 108(1).
210. See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 102 (Sept. 13, 2006).
211. Id. ¶ 102(1).
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their consent to international arbitration.212
3. Are SCEs Entitled to Make a Claim before the ICSID?
The access of public investors to ICSID is another
controversial issue because it is not clear whether public
investors can be considered “investors.”213 As stipulated in
Article 25.1, “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally.”214 A question immediately emerges when
reading Article 25: Does the ICSID focus on private investment?
According to its preamble, the ICSID was established with
regard to “the role of private international investment.”215
In ICSID case law, arbitrators have excluded jurisdiction
over disputes between two states. It stated in the Maffezzini case
(2000) that “[j]ust as the Centre has no jurisdiction to arbitrate
disputes between two States, it also lacks jurisdiction to
arbitrate disputes between two private entities. Its main
jurisdictional feature is to decide disputes between a private
investor and a State.”216 Moreover, the decision in the case
Ceskoslovenska Obchodní Bankav v. Slovak Republic explained
that:
The language of Article 25(1) of the Convention makes
clear that the Centre does not have jurisdiction over
disputes between two or more Contracting States.
Instead, the dispute settlement mechanism set up by the
Convention is designed to deal with disputes between
212. See id. ¶ 97.
213. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Treaty] (explaining the jurisdiction of the ICSID). See
generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2009) (providing an in depth look at the ICSID
Convention).
214. ICSID Treaty, supra note 213, art. 25(1).
215. Id. pmbl.
216. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 74 (Jan. 25, 2000).
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Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
States.217
Actually, in ICSID case law, arbitrators have set a condition
of control on jurisdiction over disputes between a state and a
SCE. It is again in the Ceskoslovenska case that the issue was
discussed which elaborated that:
Although the concept of “national”, as that term is used
in Article 25(1), is in Article 25(2) declared to include
both natural and juridical persons, neither term is
defined as such in the Convention. The legislative history
of the Convention does provide some answers, however,
that bear on the issues presented in this case. It indicates
that the term “juridical persons” as employed in Article
25 and, hence, the concept of “national,” was not intended
to be limited to privately-owned companies, but to
embrace also wholly or partially government-owned
companies. This interpretation has found general
acceptance.218
There is no exclusion a priori of public investors but
arbitrators underscore that “[w]hile it cannot be doubted that in
performing the above-mentioned activities, Ceskoslovenska
Obchodni Banka was promoting the governmental policies or
purposes of the State, the activities themselves were essentially
commercial rather than governmental in nature.”219
In the same vein, the GEA v. Ukraine Award found that an
attempt to make the respondent liable for the actions of a former
state-owned entity could not succeed because the record made it
clear that the company was a separate legal entity, acting
entirely in a commercial capacity, for which the respondent was
not responsible.220 It seems that arbitrators wanted to rely on a
criterion which would be the nature of the economic activities
without, however, providing detailed criteria by which to enable
a better definition of such an activity. In the current scenario,

217. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 16 (May 24,
1999).
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 20.
220. GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16,
Award, ¶ 262 (Mar. 31, 2011).
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one can simply observe that tribunals have slightly stretched the
ICSID convention to allow SCEs, when they act on a commercial
basis, to access international arbitration. In that sense, the
whole global investment regime has been adjusted to the reality
of new SCE actors. In essence, the nature of the economic
activities has become more important than the nature of the
SCEs.
Another important legal issue is the sequence of events in
an ICSID claim. Should a tribunal first look at Article 25 (quite
narrow) or start with the BIT definition (usually broader). All
this might be relevant to the discussion around the notion of
investor under ICSID (i. e., the legal standing of SCEs under
ICSID). Overall, it seems that there is no clear-cut methodology.
In the Tokies Tokeles disputes, Professor Weill issued a
dissenting opinion. He said that:
To decide the jurisdictional issue the Decision should,
therefore, have checked first whether the Tribunal has
jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Convention—
interpreted, as the decision recalls, in light of its object
and purpose—and then, in a second stage, whether it has
jurisdiction also under the bilateral investment treaty. It
is only if the tribunal had reached the conclusion that it
has jurisdiction under the Convention that it would have
had to examine whether it has jurisdiction also under the
BIT. This, however, is not how the Decision proceeds. It
states that “we begin our analysis of this jurisdictional
requirement by underscoring the deference this Tribunal
owes to the definition of corporate nationality contained
in the agreement between the Contracting Parties, in
this case, the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT.” And this is what
it does: it begins with the “Definition of ‘investor’ in
Article 1(2) of the BIT,” and then in a second stage it
turns to the “Consistency of Article 1(2) of the BIT with
the ICSID Convention.”221
However, it is the opposite approach that was applied by the
tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvor since it started with the
applicable BIT before it looked at Article 25. 1 ICSID.222 The
221. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion
(Chairman Prosper Weill), ¶ 14 (Apr. 29, 2004).
222. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 75 (Apr. 16, 2009).
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tribunal “applied these criteria to the contract and concluded
that it constituted an investment pursuant to the BIT as well as
Article 25 of the Washington Convention.”223 Also, in Global
Trading v. Ukraine, the tribunal said that:
Against that background, the Tribunal turns now to an
analysis of the two governing treaties, namely the BIT
and the ICSID Convention, in the light of the arguments
put before it by the parties to the Arbitration. There
seems to be no set methodology among ICSID tribunals
as to whether the analysis ought to begin with the BIT,
which goes to the condition of consent within the
meaning of the ICSID Convention, or with the notion of
investment under the ICSID Convention. In the present
case, it makes no difference where the analysis starts.
The Tribunal accordingly finds it convenient to begin
with the BIT.224
IV.

NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONS AS THE
BOUNDARIES OF SCES’ RIGHTS

SCEs from various jurisdictions make investments and are
becoming major legal actors because they can file a claim before
international tribunals. This, in turn, raises the question of the
substantive rights which is now given to state capitalism
actors.225 The actionable rights of an SCE can fundamentally be
divided into two stages.
Firstly, the pre-establishment stage and the associated preestablishment rights (see Annex 2). These refer to the entry of
investments and investors of a party (member country of a trade
or investment agreement) into the territory of another party.

223. Id.
224. Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11,
Award, ¶ 46 (Dec. 1, 2010).
225. See generally Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in the
House of Lords to the Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics
in International Dispute Resolution, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV.
L.J. 1 (2013) (explaining that states must provide effective means of asserting
claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment); George K. Foster,
Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International
Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment Treaties, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 361 (2013) (explaining that states’ power to regulate the host
country related to environment and human rights has been undermined by
investment treaties).
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Each party allows the investors of other parties to establish an
investment in their territory on terms no less favorable than
those that apply to domestic investors (NT) or investors from
third countries (MFN treatment). In the case of the provision on
performance requirements, pre-establishment refers to the
prohibition of imposing certain performance requirements as a
condition for the establishment of an investment.226 Preestablishment is rarely granted without exceptions since every
country has sensitive sectors where foreign investment is not
permitted. In fact, members of a trade or investment agreement
usually list a number of measures (for example, laws and
regulations) or entire sectors where pre-establishment (free
entry of investments and investors) do not apply.
Secondly, there is the post-establishment stage and
associated post-establishment rights. These refer to the
operation of an investment. It guarantees that foreign investors
and their investments (those of another member country of the
trade or investment agreement), once established or admitted,
are treated no worse than domestic investors and their
investments (NT) or any other foreign investors and their
investments (MFN treatment).227
C. EXCEPTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Globalization has encouraged more foreign investment
around the world and brought about more regulations to protect
investors from any discriminatory action. Over the past decades,
SCEs have been active in the FDI market. Correspondingly,
concerns about the purpose of SCEs have been raised to
attention, for example, whether the government behind intends
to carry out any political action by making such investment and
226. Joshua Boone, How Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL
BUS. L. REV. 187, 187 (2011) ( “The idea was to facilitate . . . investment flows
by the opening up of secure channels for foreign direct investment . . .
stabilizing the investment climate, granting protective investment guarantees,
and providing neutral dispute mechanisms for ‘injured’ investors.”); see also
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 20, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No.
E.09.II.D.20 (2009) [hereinafter Role of IIAs in Attracting FDI].
227. See Michael Hahn and Kateryna Holzer, EMERGING ISSUES IN
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY
RELATING TO NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 267
(Mitsuo Matsushita & Thomas J. Schoenbaum eds. 2016).

2018]

STATE CAPITALISM ON THE ASCENT

391

whether the foreign investment will be a threat to the country.
This section will discuss how the national security exception
plays a role in foreign investment in the area of SOEs and SWFs.
It will look at the available international economic law—WTO
Law, IIAs, and CIL—and study the problems or gaps that need
to be filled, conclude whether there can be improvements or
possible solutions to tackle the problems, and bring spotlight to
the world’s latest update in this area.
The issue of national investment legislation is based on
national security, which may block, impede, undo, or in some
other way adversely affect investments made by SCEs. Such a
domestic action would not be a violation of its GATS Mode 3
commitments in itself. The country may indeed rely on GATS
Article XIV bis in order to benefit from the “security exception.”
It is true that one of the most critical concerns regarding foreign
acquisitions is national security.228 The problem with national
security issues is that there is no way to clearly define what
types of investment invoke these concerns and what types do
not. Most IIAs maintain exceptions for national security or
subject investments to national interest tests.229
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE
SCEs investment raises concerns because they highlight the
importance of state activity in the global economy, which is
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces. SCEs may
not make investment decisions based on economic reasons, but
instead they may choose to invest for political purposes.
Furthermore, most countries that have set up SCEs are located
in the developing world which ultimately may result in a
politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SCEs.

228. Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their
Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defense of
Necessity, 28 ICSID REV. 351, 382 (2013); see also Chaisse, Exploring the
Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections, supra
note 115, at 358–59 (2013).
229. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, N.Z.-China, art. 201, ¶ 1,
Apr. 7, 2008, 2590 U.N.T.S. 46123 (showing exception for certain “essential
security interests” and full investor-state arbitration provisions, even if
countries conclude BITs and FTAs making it broadly easier for firms from either
country to invest in the other, that sort of exception could be invoked by a
contracting party, for example, to block or restrict an investment.).
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The range of reasons articulated by host countries for
scrutinizing SCEs and state-owned entities (SOEs) more than
private investors are indicated in Box 1 below.
Box 1. Main Reasons to Scrutinize SCEs more than
Private Investors


Fears that countries, as controlling authorities of SWFs, invest in
companies with a view to acquiring “know-how” (e. g. , dual-use
(civil and military) items and technologies; research, produce or
trade in weapons; intellectual property)



Danger of foreign investment in companies that are directly or
indirectly involved with issues of national security (e. g. , wire
tapping and mail interception equipment; cryptology services;
activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets)



“Political” investments that create dependencies (e. g. , in the
energy sector; water);



Lack of transparency in the investment policy of SWFs



Reciprocity: How can countries that invest in foreign companies
via SWFs be prompted to adopt at his needs finishing. less
restrictive policy with regard to foreign investment in their own
country (e. g. Russia)?

E. LEGAL EXCEPTIONS
As there are more transnational investment transactions
around the world, many countries have signed different
international investment agreements, bilateral or multilateral,
with different countries to stimulate market openness so as to
attract more FDIs to build their economies. These agreements
contain obligations, thought; he national security exception is a
type of exceptions exempt from obligations assumed. It mainly
controls the over-protection concern regarding measures against
SWFs.
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The fundamental concern is how to balance between
national security and market liberalization. On the one hand,
the host country has to protect its own nation and fellow citizens,
while on the other hand, the foreign investor are concerned
about being discriminated due to abuse of the protective
measures by the host state. Additionally, such protective acts
may also bring further political tensions.
The issue of sovereign investment has raised attention due
to opaqueness. As governments are involved, some doubt that
the true motives behind sovereign investment are politicallydriven.230 SWFs mostly lack transparency, so the host country
cannot determine whether the intentions of such investment are
genuinely commercial or the investment will jeopardize national
security and financial stability.231 They believe that if strategic
industries fall under foreign control, the foreign government will
take the advantage to attack the host country.232 For instance,
assuming that a foreign country acquires a telecommunication
company in another country, it is reasonable to be cautious that
a leak of confidential information by surveillance may be
possible.
Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the concerns
provoked some countries to regulate and restrict sovereign
investment in certain sectors, such as telecommunication and
commodities.233 Even though there are studies indicating that
restrictions are unnecessary,234 governments should always stay
mindful of guarding harm. Some argue the measures for being
over-protective and discriminatory to attract FDIs are the
breach of international economic law.235
Before the law regarding national security was developed,
only Customary International Law could be relied on. To avoid
disputes, including national security exceptions in international

230. Bart De Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth
Funds: Reconciling International Economic Law and the Law of State
Immunities with a New Role of the State, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 779, 784 (2009).
231. Id. at 785.
232. Id.
233. See, e. g., HELMUT REISEN, OECD DEV. CTR., POL’Y BRIEF NO. 38: HOW
TO SPEND IT: COMMODITY AND NON-COMMODITY SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 6
(2008).
234. Id.
235. Fabio Bassan, Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, between
National Security and International Law, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 165, 180 (2010).
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treaties has been a developing trend.236
F. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) LAW
There are more than 160 members in the WTO, which
means that WTO law is multilaterally binding.237 Since most
countries involved in FDI are WTO members, WTO law becomes
a principal law to solve many legal problems. This section will
discuss why the GATS is more relevant and when the GATS is
applicable in the context of SWFs. The section will then
illustrate some major roles of the national security exception
under the GATS and conclude by examining some underlying
problems.
Within the WTO treaties, the GATS is more relevant and
important in the context of SWFs because it is the only legally
binding law in relation to investment.238 Although the GATT
does contain an article about Security Exception239 and thus is
theoretically applicable, its principles are relatively limited.
Some scholars view that GATT is too general.240 Even with its
investment-related reference treaty, the Agreement on TradeRelated Investment Measures (TRIMs), the GATT is still short
of specific discipline. It means that the general principles
provided may not be applicable to some specific investments,
while the TRIMs do not give enough additional support and
reference.241
On the contrary, the GATS is more relevant when talking
about FDIs such as SWFs because FDI nowadays trends towards
the service sector. The purpose of GATS is to make sure the
service sectors are liberalized for foreign investments, including
state investments such as SOEs and SWFs, by “facilitating the

236. Id. at 189.
237. See generally Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing the WTO Conformity
Obligation: A Theory of Compliance as a Process, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 57
(2015) (showing that the law of the WTO is superior to domestic legal systems
and WTO has reformulated a secondary obligation among its members); Julien
Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the
International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013) (arguing that WTO has
contributed much toward a rule-oriented international trading system and that
WTO should combine hard law and soft law in the future).
238. De Meester, supra note 230, at 780.
239. GATT, supra note 119, art. 21.
240. Bassan, supra note 235, at 173.
241. Id.
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freedom of capital inflows in the service sector.”242 Hence, it is
more specific yet flexible to be applied to service-related FDIs.
The GATS is applicable to FDI when the investment takes
form of “commercial presence” mode in the service sector,
meaning that the foreign investor holds fifty percent
ownership.243 Therefore, only when SWFs tend to take control of
the target company will the GATS be applicable.
To promote market liberalization in service sectors to
foreign investors, the GATS imposes obligations on the host
states.244 However, these obligations are subject to general
exceptions and specific exceptions. The GATS Article 14 bis
Security Exception illustrates one of the general exceptions
regarding national security that the host state can rely on to
refuse foreign investments. The purpose of this exception is to
“preserve members’ freedom of action in areas relating to
national defense and security.”245 The article provides that the
states are exempted from the non-discriminatory obligations
imposed when the investment concerns an “essential security
interest.”246 It is reasonable for the host states to enforce
necessary actions to restrain the access of FDIs to defend their
national security interests and uphold public safety and
stability.
G. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CASE LAW
Cases are very useful in filling in the gaps of the uncertainty
of any IIA provisions regarding national security exception in
order to predict the outcome while making investment decisions.
As discussed above, the phrases like “essential security” or
“national security” are too broad. This results in investment
disputes which may lead to lawsuits. This section will study
some significant cases which give more guidelines on how to
interpret the IIAs.

242. Efraim Chalamish, Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign
Funds, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 645, 661 (2012).
243. Id. at 660.
244. Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law to
Sovereign Investments: Sovereign Wealth Funds as “Investors” Under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 2015 INT’L REV. L. 1, 6 (2015).
245. Id. at 14.
246. GATS supra note 129, art. 14.
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1. Republic of Nicaragua v. United States247

The case concerned whether the United States was justified
in invoking the security defense in the context of the BIT signed
between two countries. The words “necessary to protect its
essential security interests”248 were brought under the spotlight
in this case. The United States argued that the provision
justified the adoption of the measure.249 However, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) compared the provision with
the security exception under the GATT and found that the party
may adopt measures that they “consider necessary” whereas the
provision under the FCN Treaty “speaks simply of ‘necessary’
measures, not those considered by a party to be such.”250
Therefore, it was held that the measure was not necessary to
protect the security interest of the United States and that the
provision did not allow any self-judging measures.251 Thus, the
protective measure made by the United States was not final.
2. Commission v. Belgium252
There are various cases regarding the exception in the
context of EU law. The proportionality test is used to justify the
protective or restrictive measures implemented against the
investment. This case held that the measure was compatible,
and four criteria were set out to justify the use of the security
exception.253 The criteria are (1) the national measures must aim
247. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. United States), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 1 (June 27).
248. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nicar.-U.S., art. 21,
Jan. 21, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 449, 465.
249. Nicar. v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. at 141, ¶ 280. These measures
related to the military and paramilitary activities carried out by the United
States against Nicaragua from 1981 to 1984. See Fernando R. Teson, Appraisals
of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. Unites States (Merits), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 77
(1987); Zia Modabber, Collective Self-Defense: Nicaragua v. United States, 10
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. LAW J. 449 (1988).
250. Id. ¶ 222, at 116.
251. Id. ¶ 272, at 141–42.
252. Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809.
253. Id. at ¶¶ 46–51. It related to the provisions of the Royal Decree of 10
June 1994, specifically, the regulation concerning golden shares held by
Belgium in private undertakings in the two companies, which were engaged in
transportation and the supply of gas. See Carlos Padros & Endrius E. Cocciolo,
Security of Energy Supply: When Could National Policy Take Precedence over
European Law, 31 ENERGY L. J. 31, 43, 45 (2010). See also Bassan, supra note
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at the protection of a legitimate general interest, (2) foresee
strict time limits for the exercise of opposition rights, (3) the
assets or management decisions targeted must be specifically
listed, and (4) the system’s objective and stable criteria must be
subject to an effective review by the domestic courts.254 This case
provides and clarifies the idea of how to justify the breach. The
member may appropriately invoke the exception on the grounds
of public order or public security when the criteria are satisfied.
3. Argentine Cases
After the Argentine economic crises in 2002, Argentina was
involved in a series of lawsuits. The most significant dispute
dealing with the national security exception was between
Argentina and the United States.255 Like most recent BITs, the
Argentina-United States BIT allows state-versus-state dispute
settlement concerning the national security exception.256
The BIT references the security exception provision with the
phrase “the [p]rotection of its own essential security
interests.”257 In one of the cases, it was held that major economic
emergencies were considered “essential security interests.”258
So, prima facie, Argentina could invoke the exception. However,
the court continued to express that the article was not selfjudging.259 The decision shows that the court is reluctant to let
states determine whether they can invoke the exceptions.260 The
judgment also provides a framework that when either party
would like to justify its breach of obligations based on the BIT’s
exception, that party should show the relationship between the
measures adopted and the “resolution of the crisis.”261 In
235.
254. Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809.
255. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 332 (May 12, 2005).
256. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, Arg.-U.S., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992).
257. Id.
258. See CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 ¶ 359.
259. Id. ¶ 373.
260. Id.
261. Id. ¶ 320–9, 355–6, 374; See also Continental Casualty Co. v. Republic
of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 181, 196-197, 214, 227, 232-233
(Sept. 5, 2008); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 376, 388 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron v. Republic of Arg., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 334 (May 22, 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v.
Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 239–42, 257
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considering the applicability of Art XI Argentina-US BIT, the
tribunals have adopted various interpretations of what may
constitute ‘necessary’ in the cases involved US investors
challenged Argentina’s emergency measures. The first three
tribunals to deal with claims under Art. XI are CMS,262
Encron,263 and Sempra.264 These tribunals conflated the
requirements of Art. XI with the customary international law of
necessity defense and each of the decisions was subject to
application for annulment.265 The LG&E tribunal adopted a
more flexible approach in determining the concept of “necessary”
and stated the measures were suitable to respond to the crisis.266
This approach has been criticized as “overly deferential”267
without considering the effectiveness of the measures, but it
seemed to have “required that the package of measures as a
whole was capable of achieving the objective.”268 The tribunal in
Continental case held that in determining the suitability of the
measures to arrest the crisis, they need to decide whether the
measures had ‘contributed materially’ to achieve the goals.269 In
deciding the alternative measures, the tribunal granted ‘a
certain deference’ given the circumstances of economic crisis,270
and concluded in general the measures ‘were applied in a
reasonable and proportionate way.’271 The Argentine cases
provide direction on how a decision would likely conclude, which
increases certainty. The decisions give more clarifications on
how to interpret the security exception provision of a BIT when
(Oct. 3, 2006).
262. CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 ¶ 320–9, 355–6,
374.
263. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 334.
264. Sempra Energy Int’l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 376, 388.
265. CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND
REGULATORY AUTONOMY 87–90 (2015); Jürgen Kurtz, Adjudging the
Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public Order and
Financial Crisis, 59 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 325, 341–51 (2010).
266. LG&E Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability,
¶ 239–42, 257. See HENCKELS, supra note 265, at 90.
267. HENCKELS, supra note 265, at 90. See also Christina Binder & August
Reinisch, Economic Emergency Powers: A Comparative Law Perspective in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 503, 511
(Stephan Schill ed., 2010); Kurtz, supra note 265, at 356.
268. HENCKELS, supra note 265, at 90.
269. Continental Casualty Co. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 196-197, 214, 232 (Sept. 5, 2008).
270. Id. ¶ 181, 198–9, 233.
271. Id. ¶ 227, 232.
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the key terms are unclear. The case law provided lessons to the
states for clearer terms and has assisted them to negotiate and
conclude new BITs. After the Argentine case, the United States
updated its treaty language based on the United States Model
BIT.272 The United States has ensured the exception is selfjudging, so it can be invoked easily.273 Therefore, the claims
actually fill in the existing gap and help further better the
investment law and promote sovereign investments.
H. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (CIL)
When the treaties do not help conclude transnational
problems, CIL is exercised. When binding treaties between the
parties do not include explicit provisions, CIL is applied to seek
clarification. In fact, there are quite a number of cases in which
CIL has been used to reach conclusions. There are two major
doctrines under CIL related in this context: necessity and selfdefense, which are mostly used when dealing with national
security concerns.274 These two doctrines are uncodified but
recognized by the International Law Commission in
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC
Articles).275 The principles are often explicitly included in
treaties so that legal cases will be considered according to CIL.
ILC Article 25 provides a framework on how a state can justify
the use of the security exception under the necessity defense of
CIL. Two criteria have to be satisfied: first, the party who would
like to invoke the defense must prove that the questioned
measure is “the only way” to protect its essential interest, and
second, that the measure “does not seriously impair an essential
interest” of “the international community as a whole.”276 To
avoid any abuse, Article 25 strictly limits the conditions for
using the necessity defense, including national security. 277
However, the inclusion of national security does not
automatically mean that the issue rises to necessity. The phrase
“the international community as a whole” is meant to prevent
any acts of corruption so as to encourage an honest investment
272. U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INV. TREATY ART. 20 (DEP’T OF STATE 2012).
273. Id.
274. Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, arts. 21, 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4 (Dec. 12, 2001).
275. Id.
276. Id. art. 25(1).
277. Id.
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environment and protect the collective interest of every country.
CIL cannot be used as a means to exclude any wrongfulness or
as an excuse because this will affect the collective interest, which
consequently results in political tensions and influences the
global investment environment.
The case Sempra Energy International v. Republic of
Argentina details how CIL can be applied to decide whether the
related security exception can be invoked. It illustrates that the
court will check if there is any violation of treaties by
interpreting the terms literally.278 If the concerned treaties do
not consist of any self-judging feature, the measures adopted will
then be examined to see if it is necessary for the party to invoke
the exception. 279 Lastly, CIL will help define the scope of
“essential security,” in this case under ILC Article 25.280
Therefore, it seems that the CIL acts as a last resort for the state
party to justify its breach of obligation due to national security.
Some scholars commented that “[t]he notion of necessity
ascertained in the international customary law . . . is far more
accurate than the definition of essential security interest . . . in
national statutes.”281 This is because the ILC Articles provides a
clear framework on how to justify measures adopted under the
necessity defense. Related cases further upheld the certainty of
such framework. Apart from being used to interpret explicit
national security provisions, CIL determines whether there is
any implicit exception “to permit states to respond to
emergencies and to hostile actions by others.”282 Some treaties
may not include an explicit provision about national security
exemptions, but it would be unreasonable for a state to have no
right to carry out protective measures to safeguard its security.
Hence, CIL can imply the use of a national security exception.

278. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16,
Award, ¶ 389 (Sept. 28, 2007).
279. Id. ¶ 388.
280. Id. ¶ 375.
281. Bassan, supra note 235, at 192.
282. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National
Security, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 445 (2008).
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V. UNITED STATES-CHINA BIT
The recent focus on the national security exception is the
BIT negotiation between the United States and China because
these two countries are leaders in international economics. The
conclusion of the United States-China BIT will encourage more
FDI between the two countries.283 This BIT will be important in
regards to the national security exception in the context of SWFs
because most FDIs by communist China in foreign countries are
in SWF form.284 The United States has been involved in many
significant cases on rejecting sovereign investments, such as the
Dubai Port World, and the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC).285 In the CNOOC acquisition case, the
United States decided to reject this sovereign investment,
fearing that this acquisition deal would threaten its national
security.286 However, to avoid tensions with the United States,
China eventually withdrew its investment on Unocal Oil
Company due to political pressure.287 Because no BIT exists
between the two countries, only WTO law and the term
“essential security” was concerned. In the recent United StatesChina Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the BIT was one of the
negotiation topics.288 Within the BIT negotiation, cyber-security
has been one of the security concerns.289 Placing a high
importance on its national security, especially after the 9/11
incident and Snowden political scandals, the United States will
stand strong on safeguarding its security interests and rights to
invoke the security defense. Also, the target is “communist”
China, which has been involved in many FDI-related violations,
such as violations of cybersecurity and intellectual property
283. C. Fred Bergsten et al., Toward a US-China Investment Treaty,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 2015), https://piie.com/sites/default/files/
publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf.
284. Qingxiu Bu, China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds: Problem or Panacea?,
11(5) J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 849, 850–51 (2010).
285. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING
TIDE, RISING STAKES 47 (2006).
286. Id. at 50.
287. Id. at 48–50.
288. William Johnson, The Five Most Important Issues in U.S.-China
Relations, REUTERS (June 23, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2015/06/23/the-five-most-important-issues-in-u-s-china-relations/.
289. US Says Progress Made in Talks with China on Currency Issues, CyberSecurity, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 25, 2015, 11:15 am),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1826327/us-saysprogress-made-talks-china-currency-issues-cyber.
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rights. Therefore, negotiation will be difficult for both
countries290—especially for the United States, which has agreed
to various treaties with different countries.
The conclusion of the BIT is forward-looking. It not only will
promote trade liberalization and further encourage FDIs but will
also become a cornerstone of international economics.
VI.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

After investigating different types of applicable law, it is
apparent that the law is still uncertain. The law in the context
of sovereign investment is not perfect and has not been updated
to be in sync with the rise and change of SWFs.
Some scholars have expressed the view that international
economic law should ascertain the rights of states in this area,
particularly by amending the terms in treaties.291 Some suggest
clarifications by the WTO, inclusion of obligations regarding
SWFs, or clearer definitions provided by the IIAs.292 These
suggestions have their benefits and concerns. “The broader these
exceptions are, the easier it will be for governments to limit
SWFs’ access . . . . The [narrower] these limits are . . . the easier
it will be for SWFs to come into the . . . market.”293 It may appear
that the listed exceptions will alleviate the problems and
depoliticize SWFs, but there is a chance that some states will
deceive the host state by taking advantage of these solutions
with political purposes.
Measures implemented by the host states may provide a
clearer way for reference. Although each country has its own law
regarding the national security review system, such as Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) in the
United States,294 the IIAs can mention the use of the respective
national law or any measures to be taken which may be different
from the express one regarding SWFs. This can increase
predictability and transparency of the review system. SWF
investors will feel more protected with more certainty and will
then be able to invest more effectively. This way, sovereign
290. See Bergsten et al., supra note 283, at 34.
291. See Bassan, supra note 235, at 193; Chaisse, supra note 23, at 588.
292. See Bassan, supra note 235, at 199–201; Chaisse, supra note 23, at 604;
Meester, supra note 230, at 816.
293. Chaisse, supra note 23, at 611.
294. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–
49, 121 Stat. 246.
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investment can be further promoted.
Some suggest standardization of IIAs may ensure certainty
and transparency.295 However, this goes against the unique
feature of every treaty. Every state has their own
characteristics, such as demography, geography, or natural
resources. Some states may demand more applications of the
national security exception, while some may not. The conclusion
of an IIA may be drafted based on previous treaties with some
terms amended accordingly, but standardized IIAs will not fit
every state and hence would create other investment problems.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The recent emergence of SCEs as active and important
players in international financial markets has raised a host of
questions, which are focused on in the current analysis. As the
current financial turmoil demonstrates, financial liquidity is
vital for Western economies. SCEs as a class of investor will
grow considerably in importance over the next decade, both by
number and volume. At the same time, the number of
international investment disputes arising from investment
agreements has increased sharply. Likewise, the cases brought
to dispute settlement have become increasingly complex,
creating various interpretations of their provisions and
generating huge debates between governments, academics, and
practitioners. There have been until now only a handful of
disputes involving state-controlled entities against host states.
It seems that rather often no restriction exists for SCE to act
under an IIA as a “qualified investor” (but treatment standards
may vary from one treaty to another). These investors may also
rely on the more adequate investor–state dispute mechanism
instead of the more political state-to-state dispute procedures,
which demonstrates the potential for international investment
arbitration involving SCEs.
SCEs are on the rise and likely to increase even more. Once
the crisis is over, the problems will return. There will be new
disputes that are likely to be treated as any other foreign
investor. However, SCEs do have rather more favorable access
to DSB than private actors. Meanwhile, access to arbitration
may evolve as criteria do not seem well-established. The key
issue which may be brought before arbitration is the one of
295. See Bassan, supra note 235, at 198; Chaisse, supra note 23, at 623.
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national security. If so, however, we are likely to see more cases
in which the (more broadly frustrated) home state of a frustrated
investor reacts—even in a later context—against what it may
have perceived as an overeager invocation of the national
security exception.
In the current scenario, one can simply observe that
international investment tribunals have slightly stretched the
ICSID convention to allow SCE, when they act on a commercial
basis, to access international arbitration. In that sense, the
whole global investment regime has adjusted to the reality of
new actors that are SCEs. In essence, the nature of the economic
activities has become more important than the nature of the
SCEs.
The national security exception is very crucial to
international economics because it directly affects the FDI
environment. It provides an exemption from a state’s regular
obligations to safeguard its security interests by prohibiting
suspicious government-controlled investments from being
established in its territory. However, the international economic
law also avoids any abuse of this exception. The language of the
exception in treaties determines whether a state is justified to
invoke such an exemption. Every term will be interpreted
prudently, particularly the term “essential security” in all
contexts. If there is no explicit provision addressing such
concern, then CIL will be the final resort. In fact, there are not
many cases regarding the use of the exception because no one
would like to bring political tensions. The law directly affects
FDI performance around the world. The exception plays both
political and commercial roles; it promotes market openness and
cooperation between countries. Additionally, it releases any
political tensions and improves political relationships. It
balances the national interests and financial benefits of the
sovereign parties. With the rise of SWFs and trend of FDI, there
may be more conflicts concerning national security.
Undoubtedly, the certainty of right and predictability requires
clarification of the terms. There are many suggestions to
improve the terms. The United States-China BIT conclusion will
be under the spotlight to see how the leaders will strike a
balance between tackling the national security matters and
promoting FDIs.
The current scenario is technically favorable to SCEs, and it
shows that they can now operate like any other private investor.
Further, the whole ICSID and investment regime was designed
for the promotion of foreign private investment. However, the
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SCEs have now become significant players who are treated like
any private investors. State capitalism has become ordinary,
and in this sense, state capitalism now “comes of age,” as said by
Ian Bremer.296 It is a paradox that the system states designed to
promote private investment is being gradually penetrated and
reshaped by state capitalism without much difficulty.
While there are solutions for SCEs, there are challenges for
policy-makers because it raises the question of a good definition
of investor, treatment of SCEs in future, and IIAs and treaties.
If these trends continue, namely, if direct investor-state
arbitration provisions are concluded or reinterpreted to restrict
the ability of home states to have second thoughts about foreign
investments once they have been accepted, it seems to me that
they will be more careful in allowing FDI. But when they do,
somewhere down the line, they may get a reaction from a
frustrated home state, and we will be back to the world
dominated by individual states, i.e. capitalism.

296. Bremer, supra note 1, at 46.
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Annex 1: Investment Cases (Decided and
Registered) Dealing with the Legal Standing of
SCEs
Case

Definition of
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How was the

investor in

respondent

SCE treated?

applicable

raise the

BIT
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CDC Group PLC N/A
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v. Republic of

jurisdiction are public

government

the Seychelles297
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company
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issue that

incorporated

CDC.

needed to be

under the

Seychelles
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Tribunal. As

1985 in

CDC is a

The UK

objected to the

Article 25 of the England and

jurisdiction on
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Wales. At all

allows disputes material times grounds but
“between a
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State and a

to be a

national of
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another

United

Contracting

Kingdom. The

State.”298

tribunal does

Therefore, in

not argue the

this dispute,

fulfilment of

the main legal

the conditions

during the oral

issue that arose of Art 25(1)
was whether

ICSID.

CSOB was
merely an
agent of the
Czech Republic
or not.
Generally, the
main legal
issue to decide

297. CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Sey., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14,
Award, (Dec. 17, 2003).
298. ICSID Treaty, supra note 213, art. 25.
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is whether
CSOB is a
qualified
investor, and if
so, why it is a
qualified
investor?
Ceskoslovenska

The BIT

Article 25 of

CSOB was

The Tribunal

Obchodni

meaning of

ICSID only

treated as a
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Banka, A. S. v.

investor was

allows disputes foreign

The Slovak

not

“between a

Republic299

determinant to Contracting
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State and a
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jurisdiction and
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national of

art. 25 ICSID
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Consolidation

another
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the Tribunal.
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Contracting
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stated the

State.”
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investor.

this dispute,
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Czech Republic
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main legal
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investor, and if
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so, why it is a

and not their

qualified

purpose. This

investor?

case broadens

found that the

investor based dispute was

the scope of
BITs

299. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Award, (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008).
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application and
ICSID, which
means that it
broadens the
potential
application of
investment law.
The measures
taken by the
CSOB to
improve its
balance and
consolidate its
financial
position,
removing from
the books nonperforming
assets derived
from activities
conducted by
the bank when
acted as agent
of the state,
must be
deemed to be
commercial in
character. The
ability to
negotiate in
favorable
conditions,
determined by
the interest of
the States, does
not transform
commercial
transactions
into
government
acts.
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300. Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/15, Award, (Sept. 13, 2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 173 (2016).
301. Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investors, art. 1, Nor.-Hung.,
Apr. 8, 1991.
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contracting
State also
means “any
juridical person
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304. Kaliningrad Region v. Lith., ICC, Final Award, (Jan. 28, 2009).
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of the Russian
Federation to
invest in the
territory of the
Republic of
Lithuania; in
regards to the
Republic of
Lithuania: any
entity
constituted
and registered
in the territory
of the Republic
of Lithuania in
conformity
with its
legislation.”305
Hrvatska

“Investor’

Elektroprivreda means: (a)

Issues of

“HEP,” the

The majority of

jurisdiction

Croatian

the Tribunal

d. d. v. The

with respect to were not

national

found that

Republic of

a Contracting

seriously

electric

Slovenia was

Slovenia306

Party:

contested in

company,

liable to HEP

(i) a natural

this arbitration. changed its

for the financial
value of

person having

status from a

the citizenship

state-owned to undelivered

or nationality

a joint-stock

electrical power

of or who is

company.

from July 1,

permanently

From 1994 to

2002 to April

residing in

the date of

10, 2003. This

that

award, the

case shows that

Contracting

Croatian

state controlled

Party in

government

entitles can

accordance

owned 100% of make a claim

with its

the stock in

as an investor.

305. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of the
Investments, art. 1, Lith.-Russ. June 29, 1999.
306. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Slovn., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24,
Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue, (June 12, 2015); Hrvatska
Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Slovn., ICSID Case No. AERB/05/24, Award, (Dec. 17,
2005).
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applicable law;

HEP. HEP

or other

Issues of
was claimed to jurisdiction
have operated were not

organization

on a cost-

(ii) a company

accordance

seriously
covering basis. contested
The
between the

with the law

jurisdiction

parties to this

applicable in

was not

arbitration.

that

examined

“The two State

Contracting

under art 25

Parties to the

Party;

(1) ICSID

[2001]

(b) with

Convention.

Agreement

organized in

respect to a

have entered

‘third state,’ a

into it as the

natural

ultimate

person,

shareholders of

company or

the immediate

other

‘Shareholders’

organization

of NEK d. o. o.”

which fulfils,

The Agreement

mutatis

establishes in

mutandis, the

detail the

conditions

points

specified in

generally

subparagraph

included in a

(a) for a

shareholders

Contracting

agreement. In

Party.” 307

doing so it gives
their respective
wholly-owned
immediate
‘Shareholders’
of NEK d. o. o.
the right to
arbitrate
directly against
the ‘other State
Party’ for any
failure on the
latter’s part to
cause its

307. Energy Charter Treaty art. 1.7, Dec. 17, 1994, I-36116 U.N.T.S. 95.
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wholly-owned
‘Shareholder’ to
comply with the
Agreement.
Moreover, in
Article 12(1)2 of
the Agreement
(entitled
‘Protection of
Investments’)
‘[t]he
Contracting
Parties
agree . . . that
they shall
ensure fair and
impartial
treatment of
the
Shareholders
belonging to the
other
Contracting
Party on their
territories, i. e.
that they shall
treat such
Shareholder
the same way
as its own
Shareholder,
with full
protection and
security of
investments for
the duration of
the joint
investment.”308

308. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Decision on the
Treaty Interpretation Issue, ¶ 168.
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Mohamed

“Arab investor: Issues of

The Tribunal

The Tribunal

Abdulmohsen

an Arab citizen jurisdiction

rejected the

upheld its own

Al Kharafi &

who owns

were the main

request to join jurisdiction,

Sons Co. v The

Arab capital

legal issues of

LIA,

Government of

which he

this

acknowledged Libya to be in

the State of

invests in the

Arbitration.

the role of LIA breach of

Libya and others territory of a

and found

as an integral contract, Libya

(Libyan

State Party of

part of Libya,

law, and the

Investment

which he is not

including the

Unified

Authority

a national.” 310

role of

Agreement for

(“LIA”) 2012)309

implementing the Investment
this arbitral

of Arab Capital

award.

in the Arab
States.

Beijing Urban

TBD312

TBD

Beijing Urban Pending (as of

Construction

Construction

January 2018,

Group Co. Ltd.

Group is a

the proceeding

v. Republic of

large

is suspended,

Yemen311

international

pursuant to the

comprehensive parties’
construction

agreement.)

group.
Nominally,
this company
is a limited
company
publicly listed
at Shanghai
Stock
Exchange. In
fact, this
company that

309. Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. v. Libya, Final Arbitral
Award, 263, 266, 268, (Mar. 22, 2013) (Ad-hoc Arb.).
310. Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab
States art. 1.7, Nov. 26, 1980.
311. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/30, (May 31, 2017).
312. The Tribunal will apply the China- Yemen BIT. Id. ¶ 53; see Agreement
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Yemen, China-Yemen, Feb. 16, 1998, http://globalsummitryproject.
com.s197331.gridserver.com/RuleofLaw/bits/yemen2010.html.
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began its
operation in
1958 as a
state-owned
professional
survey and
design
institute,
specifically for
the Beijing
Subway Line.
Then the
Company was
converted into
a joint stock
company with
limited
liability and
renamed as
‘Beijing Urban
Construction
Design
Development
Group Co.,
Ltd. on
October 28,
2013.
Therefore, this
company is
less likely to
be a stateowned
company
because there
is no factual
evidence
showing so.
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Hanocal

The term

Data not

“IPIC is the

N/A (The

Holding B. V.

``investors”

available (the

International

proceeding was

and IPIC

means with

proceeding

Petroleum

discontinued

International B. regard to

was

Investment

after the first

V. v. Republic of either

discontinued

Company,

hearing and

Contracting

after the first

formed by the the Tribunal’s

Party:

hearing and

Abu Dhabi

procedural

a) “natural

the Tribunal’s

government

order.)

persons

procedural

in 1984 to

having the

order)

invest in the

Korea313

nationality of

energy and

that

related

Contracting

sectors across

Party;” and

the globe.”315

b) “legal

Hanocal

persons

Holding B. V.

constituted

is a company

under the law

based out of

of that

Netherlands

Contracting

and is

Party,” who

categorized as

made an

an accounting

investment in

and legal

the territory

firm.

of the other
Contracting
Party.314

313. Hanocal Holding B.V. v. S. Kor., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/17, (May 20,
2015).
314. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the
Republic of Korea, art. 1, Neth.-S. Kor., July 12, 2003.
315. IPIC, TOTAL, http://ae.total.com/en-us/ipic.
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Annex 2: Substantive and Procedural Rights
Granted by IIAs to SCEs
International

Liberalization

Protection

Litigation

Litigation

Legal

(Pre-

(Substantive

(State-to-

(Investor–

establishment

Rights)

Instrument

Commitments)

BITs and
PTAs

Sometimes

“Fair and

(NAFTA like

equitable

agreements)

treatment,”

State

State

Dispute)

Dispute)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

“full protection
and security,”
expropriation
conditions and
the nondiscrimination
standards

WTO GATS

Yes (Mode 3)

Nondiscrimination
standards only

IMF
Principles

No

Institutional
framework and
governance
structure,
investment and
risk
management
framework

